Knowledge that Transforms

Preface Get access Franklin Allen, Franklin Allen Special Issue Editor Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Marco Pagano Marco Pagano Special Issue Editor Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Review of Finance, Volume 10, Issue 1, 2006, Page 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10679-006-6983-5 Published: 01 March 2006

The ownership of German corporations is quite different today from that of Anglo-American firms. How did this come about? To what extent is it attributable to regulation? A specially constructed data set on financing and ownership of German corporations from the end of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century reveals that, as in the UK, there was a high degree of activity on German stock markets with firms issuing equity in preference to borrowing from banks, and insider and family ownership declining rapidly. However, unlike in the UK, other companies and banks emerged as the main holders of equity, with banks holding shares primarily as custodians of other investors rather than on their own account. The changing pattern of ownership concentration was therefore very different from that of the UK with regulation reinforcing the control that banks exercised on behalf of other investors.

We consider an incomplete market in the form of a multidimensional Markovian factor model, driven by a general marked point process (representing discrete jump events), as well as by a standard multidimensional Wiener process. Within this framework, we study arbitrage-free gooddeal pricing bounds for derivative assets, thereby extending the results by Cochrane and Saá Requejo (2000) to the point process case, while, at the same time, obtaining a radical simplification of the theory. To illustrate, we present numerical results for the classic Merton jump-diffusion model. As a by-product of the general theory, we derive extended Hansen-Jagannathan bounds for the Sharpe Ratio process in the point process setting.

A variation of the Rothschild-Stiglitz' equilibrium is examined in the context of competitive lending under adverse selection. The predictions of the model are tested in an experimental market setting. If equilibrium exists, the loan contracts offered and taken should separate projects by quality. When equilibrium exists, the experiments confirm the theory. The entrepreneurs with high-risk projects take bigger loans and pay higher credit spreads than those with low-risk projects. When equilibrium does not exist, which happens exactly when the candidate equilibrium does not provide a Pareto-optimal allocation, in half of the sessions loan trading stabilizes around the candidate equilibrium pair. In the other half, however, markets never settle down. This finding has important implications. When lenders can offer menus of contracts, as is usually the case in reality, the outcome may not be the zero-profit separating contracts of the standard model. Worse, fitting the standard model to field data may lead to serious biases in estimated parameters while falsely accepting the model's main restriction (separation).

Repudiations rarely occur due to their extreme nature. This paper provides an empirical study based on an original database: prices of a Tsarist bond traded in Paris before and after its repudiation by the Soviets. A structural VAR is used to disentangle French market shocks from repudiation specific ones. After the repudiation, we identify shocks that are related with bailouts, hopes of partial bailouts, negotiations with the Soviets and the Russian civil war. We argue that bond prices essentially reflected expected extreme events that never took place and were thus subject to a “Peso problem”.

There has long prevailed a conventional wisdom rationalizing why firms pursue overseas listings. It argues that firms seek such opportunities to benefit from a lower cost of capital that arises because their shares become more accessible to global investors. Much recent evidence challenges this conventional wisdom. In fact, several new research initiatives have been proposed that factor into the overseas listing decision many more complex risks that globalization can create at the firm level, such as agency conflicts, transparency and disclosure concerns, and other corporate governance problems. The goal of this article is to survey, synthesize and critically review this new literature and to identify yet unresolved questions to answer.

We explore the link between international stock market comovement and the extent to which firms operate globally. Using stock returns and balance sheet data for companies in 20 countries, we estimate a factor model that decomposes stock returns into global, country- and industry-specific shocks. We find a large and statistically significant link for global shocks. A firm raising its international sales by 10 percent raises the exposure of its stock return to global shocks by two percent. This link has grown stronger over time since the mid-1980s. We find no similarly robust link between international sales and exposure to country-specific shocks.

This paper shows novel evidence on the mechanism through which financial constraints amplify fluctuations in asset prices and credit demand. It does so using contractual features of housing finance. Among agents whose housing demand is constrained by the availability of collateral, those who can borrow against a larger fraction of their housing value (achieve a higher loan-tovalue, or LTV, ratio) have more procyclical debt capacity. This procyclicality underlies the financial accelerator mechanism. Our study uses international variation in LTV ratios over three decades to test whether (a) housing prices and (b) demand for new mortgage borrowings are more sensitive to income shocks in countries where households can achieve higher LTV ratios. The results we obtain are consistent with the dynamics of a collateral-based financial accelerator in international housing markets.