A consensus has recently emerged that variables beyond the level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve can help predict bond returns. This paper shows that the statistical tests underlying this evidence are subject to serious small-sample distortions. We propose more robust tests, including a novel bootstrap procedure specifically designed to test the spanning hypothesis. We revisit the analysis in six published studies and find that the evidence against the spanning hypothesis is much weaker than it originally appeared. Our results pose a serious challenge to the prevailing consensus.

[Foreign exchange returns exhibit behavior difficult to reconcile with standard theoretical models. This article asks whether the recent findings of long swings in exchange rates between appreciating and depreciating periods affect estimates of the foreign exchange risk premium. We demonstrate how the "peso problem" introduced by expected shifts in exchange rate regimes can affect inferences about the risk premium in at least two ways: (1) it can make the foreign exchange risk premium appear to contain a permanent disturbance when it does not; and (2) it can induce bias in the foreign exchange return regressions such as in Fama (1984).]

[The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk-shifting and risk-management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in pooled regressions and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among firms in the United States.]

The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk shifting and risk management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in the cross-section and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among U.S. firms.

[I show that firms may optimally sell blocks of their own equity to other firms in anticipation of future corporate control activity. In the model, a target and one potential acquirer, who may also be an alliance partner, can negotiate before synergy values are learned. I find that equity implements an optimal mechanism, allowing the partners to extract surplus from outside bidders who may arrive later. The stake is limited by the outsiders' willingness to investigate. The results imply that corporate control may motivate an equity sale even when no takeover activity is apparent at the time or occurs ex post.]

We show that the need to "posture" can help solve the holdup problem inherent in many multistage relationships, including those between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Posturing arises when an informed party needs to send a strong signal to induce skeptical third parties like employees, suppliers, customers, or competitors to develop/maintain relationships with the firm or take other actions that increase firm value. In the venture capital context, this can be credibly achieved if the VC publicly invests at high prices in later rounds. This tempers holdup by shifting ex-post bargaining power toward the entrepreneur, inducing him to exert greater effort.

[Using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public firms, we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss substantial capital structure variation. Relative to high-credit-quality firms, lowcredit-quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants. We discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts.]

Using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public firms, we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity miss substantial capital structure variation. Relative to high-credit-quality firms, low-credit-quality firms are more likely to have a multi-tiered capital structure consisting of both secured bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with loose covenants. We discuss the extent to which these findings are consistent with existing theoretical models of debt structure in which firms simultaneously use multiple debt types to reduce incentive conflicts.

This article studies the role of risk arbitrageurs in takeovers and the source of their advantage. We show how the presence of arbitrageurs affects the value of the target shares, since arbitrageurs are more likely to tender. Therefore an arbitrageur has the informational advantage of knowing he bought shares. In equilibrium, the number of arbitrageurs buying shares and the price they pay are determined endogenously. We also present several empirical implications, including the relationship among trading volume, takeover premium, liquidity of the shares, and the number of risk arbitrageurs investing in one particular deal.

[Nonprofit, mutually owned insurance and banking organizations have significant market shares in the insurance and banking industries. A first step in a systematic study of these financial mutuals is to examine the reasons for their formation. Doing so provides empirical support for the view that these mutuals arose as an efficient means of addressing contracting challenges caused by aggregate uncertainties and moral hazard. A formal model with this property is presented. We argue that information asymmetries do more to explain the kinds of contracts offered by financial mutuals than do agency problems between owners, managers, and customers.]