The current study examines the outcomes of three fraud brainstorming procedures—nominal group, round robin, and open discussion—via a randomized between-participant field experiment involving 150 audit clients and 2,614 auditors who participated in natural, hierarchical audit teams. The results indicate that nominal group and round robin brainstorming resulted in equivalent numbers of unique fraud risks and comparable increases in planned audit hours, while open discussion brainstorming yielded the least number of unique ideas and the smallest increase in planned audit hours. Furthermore, nominal group and round robin brainstorming yielded more changes/additions to the nature and timing of substantive testing than open discussion brainstorming. Study findings offer theoretical and practical insight into fraud brainstorming.

Auditing standards require that auditors’ reliance on a specialist is commensurate with the specialist’s competence. In assessing competence, auditors encounter cues diagnostic of the specialist’s social status but less so of competence. In an experiment, we manipulate specialist status and find that auditors mistake status for competence unless they are prompted to separate the constructs. This raises the possibility that auditors could over-rely on high-status specialists. However, auditors also assess high-status specialists as more influential, and when the specialist disagrees with the client, they rely more on high-status specialists because of this perceived influence. Thus, high-status specialists can increase auditors’ willingness to challenge the client by providing a strong ally. Additional analyses suggest that auditors are aware that they rely on the specialist’s influence rather than competence, indicating that auditors do not use the process that auditing standards envision to evaluate and rely on specialists. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.

This paper examines how the treatment of audit staff who discover errors in audit files by superiors affects their willingness to report these errors. The way staff are treated by superiors is labelled as the audit office error management climate. In a “blame-oriented” climate errors are not tolerated and those committing errors are punished. In contrast, an “open” climate characterizes error commitment as a normal, albeit unfortunate aspect of organizational life that offers opportunities for learning without sanctions on the originator. We examine error management climate in the context of audit-specific factors that might affect the decision to report errors: audit error type (conceptual or mechanical) and who committed the error (the individual who discovered it or a peer). An open climate results in an increase in the reporting of mechanical (but not conceptual) errors and all peer errors versus a blame climate. Post hoc findings suggest that one obstacle to reporting conceptual errors stems from an auditor's own impression management concerns. We discuss how auditing standards and regulatory inspections may impact audit firm error management climates. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the second author subject to data confidentiality restrictions issued by the participating firms.

We investigate how the strictness of a requirement to consult on potential client fraud affects auditors' propensity to consult with firm experts. We consider two specific forms of guidance about fraud consultations: (1) strict, i.e., mandatory and binding; and (2) lenient, i.e., advisory and non-binding. We predict that a strict consultation requirement will lead to greater propensity to consult, particularly under certain client- and engagement-related conditions. Results from two experiments with 163 Dutch audit managers and partners demonstrate that consultation propensity is higher under a strict consultation requirement, but only when underlying fraud risk is high. The strictness effect is also greater under tight versus relaxed time pressure. Further, a strict standard increases auditors' perceived probability that a fraud indicator exists. Overall, we demonstrate that the formulation of a standard can have the desired effect on the judgments of auditors while also creating unexpected incentives that may influence auditor judgments. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available upon request from the authors.