This study seeks to determine whether earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium. We find that investors anticipate some earnings announcements to convey news that increases market return volatility and pay a premium to hedge this non-diversifiable risk. In particular, we find evidence of risk premiums embedded in prices of firms' traded options that are significantly positively associated with the extent to which the firms' earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk. In addition, we find that volatility risk premiums are concentrated among bellwether firms and result in predictable variation in option straddle returns around earnings announcements. Taken together, our findings show that some earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium.

We examine how the information produced by analysts when they initiate coverage contributes to the mix of firm-specific, industry-, and market-wide information available about the firm. We hypothesize that the first analyst to initiate coverage provides low-cost market and industry information allowing him/her to follow more stocks, whereas subsequent analysts provide firm-specific information to distinguish themselves from existing analysts. We use stock return synchronicity to measure the mix of information available about a firm, with higher synchronicity indicating more industry and market information. Coverage initiations of firms with no prior analyst coverage increase synchronicity, suggesting that analysts produce industry- and market-wide information. In contrast, analysts initiating coverage on firms with existing coverage appear to focus on producing firm-specific information as these initiations lead to reduced synchronicity. Together, our findings indicate that the type of information that analysts produce at initiation depends on the information provided by other analysts. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

We show that financial reporting influences consumer behavior by drawing consumer attention to announcing firms. Analyzing global positioning system (GPS) data, we document upticks in foot traffic to firms’ commercial locations immediately following their earnings announcements. This increase is more pronounced for announcements with substantial media attention, fewer concurrent announcements, heightened internet search volume, and extreme stock price jumps and earnings surprises—indicating that announcement coverage impacts consumer behavior by capturing attention. Furthermore, foot traffic increases with positive earnings for firms offering durable goods, suggesting consumers respond to news about firms’ financial prospects. Consumer attention patterns increase revenues and advertising effectiveness, ultimately suggesting that financial reporting serves a marketing function. Data Availability: All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text.