This paper examines how the interaction of perceived subjectivity and pay transparency in profit allocation is associated with an important aspect of law partners' professional judgment, namely their tendency to accede to the wishes of their client and fellow partner (labeled hereafter as partner accedence). Based on interviews with 56 corporate law partners working in large Canadian law firms, we find higher partner accedence in a less subjective system than in a more subjective system, but only under no pay transparency. We find that pay transparency (versus no transparency) is associated with increased accedence in a more subjective system, but it is marginally associated with decreased accedence in a less subjective system. In an experiment where we randomly assign MTurk participants to conditions, we replicate the finding that pay transparency (versus no transparency) has a more positive effect on partner accedence as subjectivity level increases. Data Availability: Lawyers participated in the study upon which this paper is based only after signing agreements that strict confidentiality of all data would be maintained by the researchers. As such, we are bound by these confidentiality agreements with individual lawyers interviewed for the study. Experiment data from Amazon Mechanical Turk are available from the authors.

We investigate the effects of tangible versus cash rewards in a repeated tournament setting. Firms frequently use tangible rewards to motivate employees, but minimal research has examined their effects relative to cash rewards. We conducted a field experiment at a rug wholesaler that held two consecutive sales tournaments for its retailers. The top three retailers in each tournament received either cash rewards or tangible rewards (gift cards) to be distributed to sales staff. We do not find significant effects of reward type in the first tournament. However, in the second tournament, retailers eligible for tangible rewards significantly outperformed those eligible for cash rewards, and this effect is driven by Tournament One losers. Our results are consistent with the theory that Tournament One losers competing for tangible rewards increased sales effort in the second tournament significantly more than their counterparts competing for cash rewards. Our results have practical and theoretical implications.

Socializing personnel into accepting work hour norms has been fundamental to how accounting firms function, but is now challenged by contemporary work perspectives. Using 40 semi-structured interviews of personnel across hierarchical levels at a national firm and an international firm, we show how strangeness and contradiction expressed in work hour perspectives across different levels within both firms are reconstructed as compatible and complementary. Highlighting various firm adaptations, including alternative work arrangements, offshoring, and technological tools, our interviews suggest a major shift in firms' approach toward work hours. This shift is fueled by work perspectives embraced by younger generations desiring work-life balance and purposeful work, and enabled by technology supporting remote work and increasing work efficiencies. The question remains whether firms are evolving to genuinely embody work perspectives of younger generations or restructuring to rely on a smaller workforce willing to accept traditional work hour norms, or some combination thereof.

Firms often use causal models to align decision-making with strategic objectives. However, firms often operate in changing environments such that an accurate causal model can become inaccurate. Prior research has not examined the consequences that a change in the accuracy of causal models may have for managerial learning. Using an experiment, we predict and find that providing an accurate causal model positively affects managerial learning, and this positive effect is not reduced by encouraging a hypothesis-testing mindset (HTM). However, when the model subsequently becomes inaccurate, we predict and observe that providing a causal model alone negatively affects managerial learning, although this effect is partially mitigated by additionally encouraging a HTM. Our results can inform designers of control systems about the potential implications of providing a causal model when its accuracy changes over time and demonstrate how simple encouragement of a HTM moderates the effects of providing a causal model. Data Availability: Contact the authors.