Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract Reviews the book `Break-Even Analysis: Basic Model, Variants, Extensions,' by Schweitzer et al.

Abstract Reviews the book "Accounting's Changing Role in Social Conflict," by Cheryl R. Lehman.

Abstract Recent research on cost driver analysis by Miller and Vollman (1985) and Cooper and Kaplan (1987) suggests that transactions deriving from the diversity of a firm's product line and the complexity of its production process, in addition to output volume, drive overhead costs. As a consequence, it is argued, conventional cost accounting systems based only on volume-related measures, such as units of output, direct labor hours, or machine hours, produce biased and materially misleading cost estimates for managerial decisions on price and product line (whether to continue or discontinue products, or to offer additional products). Systematic biases in cost estimates may also lead to distortions in flexible budgeting systems, variance analyses, and responsibility-accounting systems. Perhaps more important in the long run, omission of operations-based cost drivers may distort the investigation of the likely effects on costs of changes in operating strategies. Many firms have moved ahead on the basis of this perceived need for more accurate cost estimates and have designed and implemented activity-based costing systems (Schiff 1991). From an academic perspective, however, there is a need for further formal empirical research in this field. Cooper and Kaplan's (1987) evidence is based on field-study discussions with managers in a variety of manufacturing settings and experimentation with cost allocation and product-costing systems based on transactions. Foster and Gupta (1990) provide some of the first empirical evidence on the correlation of manufacturing overhead with output volume and operations- based measures that reflect characteristics of the manufacturing process. Using data obtained from 37 plants of a single manufacturing firm, Foster and Gupta found that most of the volume-related measures of output were highly correlated with manufacturing overhead (MOH), but because only a few measures of manufacturing complexity and efficiency were highly correlated with MOH, their findings leave the impression that systems based on just volume may not significantly distort information generated for managerial decision making. In contrast, we find empirical evidence in favor of incorporating operations-based cost drivers along with measures of volume in cost driver models. We draw upon previous work in cost accounting and economics to develop analogs in the airline industry for product diversity, production run volumes, and process complexity, and propose a framework for cost driver analysis in the U.S. airline industry. Using a panel of quarterly data for 1981-1985 compiled primarily from traffic and financial statistics submitted by carriers to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and Department of Transportation (DOT), we specify and estimate a multivariate system of cost functions with multiple cost drivers for the industry during the transition following deregulation. We find both volume- and operations-based cost drivers to be statistically significant. We also demonstrate the potential managerial importance of the operations-based drivers by explaining variations in marginal costs across airlines in terms of operating strategies reflected in the cost driver values. Empirical cost driver analysis is managerially significant for the industry and period that we examine. The proportion of indirect costs is large, and identification of input consumption for specific services is difficult. During the transition following deregulation, carriers adopted a rich variety of strategies to improve productivity, reduce costs, and increase market share. These strategies directly involved both volume- and operations-based cost drivers. The analytical framework and model that we have developed on the basis of prior literature concerned with the airline industry enable us to examine the differential cost effects of some of the most important strategies adopted.

Abstract The article focuses on a comment on the paper "A Multidimensional Analysis of Selected Ethical Issues in Accounting," by S. M. Flory and others that was published in a previous issue of the journal "The Accounting Review." Their motivation was to investigate factors that might influence ethical behavior, realizing that these factors are potentially complex and multifaceted. Their overall conclusion was that the scale was highly reliable and valid, and thus should be a potentially useful tool for directing research on why accountants make certain ethical judgments. However, by failing to incorporate or expressly consider a psychological framework for the ethical reasoning process, the multidimensional ethics scales developed by Flory et al. do not provide any insight into the fundamental question on what makes accountants more or less ethical, and by the very nature of the research design, the otherwise well-chosen measures of reliability and validity are biased toward high measurement scale reliability.

Abstract An issue of fundamental importance to accountants concerns the qualities possessed by, or that should be possessed by, accounting information. The usual intuition is that any distortion of accounting numbers relative to the true underlying cash flows of the firm is generally undesirable from the standpoint of investors. Indeed, among the primary qualitative characteristics of accounting information championed by the FASB in their conceptual framework is reliability, which is defined as "the quality of information that gives assurance that it is reasonably free of error and bias and is a faithful representation" (emphasis added). Normative statements about the desirable qualities of accounting information are often problematic since such information typically serves multiple purposes. For example, Gjesdal (1981) identifies a decision-making rote and a stewardship role for accounting information and shows that the two needs may not be served equally well. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that "distorted" accounting information may actually be preferred if the focus is on the stewardship value of accounting information. "Distorted" accounting information is characterized as information signals that are biased relative to the expected value of the firm or that measure the value of the firm with error (white noise). Bias and noise are meant to be representative of the many inadequacies usually attributed to accounting information. Current Generally Accepted Accounting Principles prevent or delay the recognition of certain assets and liabilities and their income statement counterparts, generating what may be thought of as bias. For example, the asymmetric recognition of certain gains and losses, accounting for R&D and advertising expenditures, and the absence of information about customers and suppliers in current financial statements imply that the consequences of certain current managerial activities are not reflected in accounting information. This is bias. Similarly, current Generally Accepted Accounting Standards require numerous estimates generating what may be thought of as noise. For example, subjective assessments such as estimated useful lives of assets, loss contingencies, impairment of asset values, and the allocation of purchase price to individual assets and liabilities in corporate acquisitions are likely to introduce noise into accounting information, even in the absence of bias. A crucial assumption underlying our analysis is that managers allocate effort across many managerial activities, all of which contribute to improving the value of the firm. For example, we can imagine an executive dividing his energies across activities like controlling costs, implementing total quality management initiatives, developing a well-trained workforce, and creating an operating environment where innovation can flourish. While activities such as these have cash flow implications for a firm, we argue that it is difficult, or impossible, to disaggregate the results of operations into individual performance measures that cleanly isolate the effects of the different activities. As a result, compensation contracts in our analysis are based on aggregate performance measures such as accounting income and share price that do not unambiguously distinguish between individual managerial activities. This does not preclude the use of detailed or disaggregated accounting information other than net income as a measure of managerial performance. Rather, it captures the idea that accounting systems cannot realistically measure the economic consequences of all managerial activities in detail. Some aggregation is inevitable, and this imposes a contracting constraint. In our model, limiting the available performance measures to accounting information and share price renders efficient managerial incentives unattainable and creates a potential contracting value for bias and noise. Given that aggregated accounting information and share price are the only available performance measures, we derive conditions under which biased accounting information can be effectively utilized to mitigate the limitations of aggregated measures by better balancing incentives across different managerial activities. In particular, we show that biased accounting information, even if it contains substantial noise, can be better than unbiased accounting information, even if it contains no noise, given that price is also available as a measure of managerial performance. As long as there is a need to provide different incentives for different managerial activities, there is a need for biased accounting information since bias enables the de facto observation of the individual components of output. In addition to examining the role of biased accounting information, our analysis demonstrates the benefits of noisy accounting information. This suggestion seems counterintuitive since noise imposes risk on the manager without generating any benefits. While the usual intuition holds in most settings, it fails to recognize that there may be an equilibrium relation between accounting information and an endogenously determined share price. A reduction in the level of noise in accounting information motivates investors to curtail private information acquisition, which dilutes the information content of price and thus lessens the usefulness of price as a measure of managerial performance. Therefore, the optimal level of noise in accounting information is a tradeoff between the usefulness of price relative to the usefulness of accounting information as measures of managerial performance. It is important to emphasize that, in this paper, the benefit of distorted accounting information (bias or noise) that accrues to shareholders is independent of any managerial motivations to manipulate the disclosure system that characterize the "earnings management" literature (see Schipper 1989). Moreover, by focusing exclusively on the stewardship value of information, we show that bias and noise are desirable because they create a "bigger pie" to be shared by all. However, we do not consider the impact of bias and noise on other aspects of shareholder welfare. Bias and noise in accounting disclosures will also impact investors' risk-sharing opportunities both through the direct effect of the distorted public disclosure and the indirect effect on private information acquisition (see, e.g., Diamond 1985). Any overall equilibrium, of course, would have to consider the interaction of all these forces. The exact nature of these tradeoffs remains an unresolved issue.

Abstract A borrowing base is a line of credit set by the lender and secured by petroleum assets. Borrowers can draw on the borrowing base only to the extent that their investment opportunities justify the related interest expenses. This measure of the firm's capacity to obtain secured loans is footnoted in the long-term debt section of the annual reports. In this paper we examine how lenders use accounting information to set the borrowing base of oil and gas firms. Determination of the borrowing base is a vital decision because it represents the lenders' exposure in the event that the borrower defaults. We find evidence on lenders' use of accounting information by examining actual lending agreements as well as through tests of association. Our sample consists of smaller petroleum firms that have a higher probability of default if unfavorable contingencies occur. The primary finding is that the value of firm's oil and gas reserves explain a large proportion of the variation in the firms' borrowing base and total outstanding debt. Unlike prior studies, we find that reserve recognition accounting (RRA) has a higher explanatory power than book values. Although major fluctuations in oil prices during the period of the study, 1984-1987, suggest that historical costs may be relatively poor indicators of changes in asset values, we observe that RRA information is used in setting the borrowing base for 21 of the 23 firms for which such agreements were available. The evidence reported in this article complements prior research (Harris and Ohison 1987, 1990; Ghicas and Pastena 1989) and enhances the regulators' implication that their mandated RRA information is useful to users of financial statements.

Abstract Reviews the book `Foundations of Accounting,' by R.J. Chambers.

Abstract Reviews the book "Accounting Certification, Educational & Reciprocity Requirements: An International Guide," by Jack R. Fay.

Abstract Reviews the book "The Information MOSAIC," by Sharon M. McKinnon and William J. Bruns, Jr.

Abstract Reviews the book "Accounting History 1976-1986: An Anthology," edited by Peter Boys and John Freear.