We analyze fund managers’ reputation concerns in an equilibrium model, in which we tie together a number of seemingly unrelated phenomena. The model shows that because of reputation concerns, hedge fund managers, especially those with an average reputation, prefer strategies with negatively skewed return distributions. One subtle consequence of this preference is that capital sometimes appears slow moving, leaving profitable investment opportunities unexploited, yet other times appears fast moving, causing large capital relocation and price fluctuations in the absence of fundamental news. More broadly, the analysis demonstrates a limitation of market discipline: fund managers may distort their investments precisely because of market discipline.

In almost every area of empirical finance, researchers confront multiple tests. One high-profile example is the identification of outperforming investment managers, many of whom beat their benchmarks purely by luck. Multiple testing methods are designed to control for luck. Factor selection is another glaring case in which multiple tests are performed, but numerous other applications do not receive as much attention. One important example is a simple regression model testing five variables. In this case, because five variables are tried, a t-statistic of 2.0 is not enough to establish significance. Our paper provides a guide to various multiple testing methods and details a number of applications. We provide simulation evidence on the relative performance of different methods across a variety of testing environments. The goal of our paper is to provide a menu that researchers can choose from to improve inference in financial economics.