Does a mother's welfare receipt increase the future dependency of her children? Does the welfare system, thus, stimulate the dependency of future generations? Parameter estimates reported here suggest such intergenerational effects. The sample comprises young girls and their mothers. After control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, a mother's welfare participation is found to increase her daughter's later welfare dependency.

This paper demonstrates how the circumstances of quitting a previous job affect the probability of a later voluntary job change. The theoretical section describes a model of expected-utility-maximizing job search and mobility. Although the inability to observe utilities associated with specific jobs precludes a direct test of the utility maximizing mobility hypothesis, a testable implication is derived in the context of a simple job search model. Utility maximization implies that workers who rely exclusively on employed search to find a new job are less likely to quit again. This theoretical implication is confirmed by the parameter estimates.

Ahstract-Analyses of voluntary labor mobility suggest that job search facilitates job change while specific training inhibits mobility. Further, given that specific skills cannot be transferred between jobs, and since both search and training are costly, it is reasonable for workers to specialize in search or specific training on a given job. Training or search specialization, however, implies that estimation methods which treat the incidence of a quit as exogenous underestimate mobility effects on wages. The larger wage effects reported here result from simultaneous estimation but also reflect more accurate measurement of wage growth between jobs.

The effects of various regulations on hospital costs are estimated using a two decade long panel data set which spans the initiation, and in some instances the repeal, of various forms of hospital regulation. The long panel fosters two improvements over previous research. First, as state hospital cost levels may affect states' incentive to regulate, fixed effect estimators alleviate omitted variable bias derived from the states' regulatory discretion. Second, the long panel permits the estimation of many different regulatory program effects, but also facilitates the analysis of potential regulatory program interaction. The empirical results suggest that previous studies have exaggerated regulatory cost savings: although some interaction effects are indicated, hospital costs appear unresponsive to most regulatory programs.