Using U.S. bank holding company data, we study the impact of the crisis liquidity programs initiated by the U.S. Federal Reserve on bank-specific information production. We find empirical evidence that following the receipt of liquidity support there was a pervasive decrease in bank stock price informativeness that increased market synchronicity and crash risk. Our findings further suggest that these effects are mainly driven by bank participation in the Discount Window (DW) and Term Auction Facility (TAF) programs. On the bright side, we confirm that the liquidity programs served their purpose in targeting and supporting illiquid banks with low core stable funding sources through the crisis.

The impact of domestic and spillover macroeconomic news from the U.S., the Eurozone and China on national sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads and spread volatility are examined over a recent period of financial instability from November 2007 to March 2012. We find that better than expected (i.e. good) news tend to reduce sovereign CDS spreads, whilst worse than expected (i.e. bad) news increases spreads. News from the three major economies has significant spillover effects on other national sovereign CDS markets but the volatility responses to domestic news and foreign news from the major economies differ. CDS spread volatility increases in response to all domestic news and good news tends to exert relatively stronger effects than bad news. In contrast, good news from the major economies is market calming and consistently reduces spread volatility and they are also economically more important than bad news. Bad news from China and the Eurozone generally increase volatility in other sovereign CDS markets but bad news from the U.S. has been calming for other sovereign CDS markets in the extended crisis period from 2007 to 2012. Our results suggest that market participants in the market for sovereign credit protection pay more attention to good news than bad news both at home and from the major economies in times of financial instability.

We investigate the extent to which emerging stock market integration affects the joint behavior of stock and bond returns using a two-stage semi-parametric approach. Using a sample of 18 emerging markets, we find an unambiguous and robust link between emerging stock market integration and stock–bond return decoupling. We explain this with a decline in the segmentation risk premia in equities modeled by De Jong and De Roon [De Jong, F., De Roon, F.A., 2005. Time-varying market integration and expected returns in emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics 78, 583–613] that leads to increased demand for stocks and reduced or unchanged demand for bonds. Our findings deliver new insights into the financial liberalization and stock–bond comovement literatures.

In this paper, we examine the effect of financial analysts on the quality of corporate investment decisions. We show that greater analyst coverage leads to higher total factor productivity within firms, a finding that is robust after using both an instrumental variable approach and an experimental design that exploits exogenous reductions in analyst coverage due to broker mergers and closures. We further identify that the positive effect of analysts on firm-level productivity emanates from their critical role in information distribution and external monitoring within more opaque and financially constrained firms and also firms with weaker investor protection.

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.

We investigate the effects of credit ratings-contingent financial regulation on foreign bank lending behavior. We examine the sensitivity of international bank flows to debtor countries’ sovereign credit rating changes before and after the implementation of the Basel 2 risk-based capital regulatory rules. We study the quarterly bilateral flows from G-10 creditor banking systems to 77 recipient countries over the period Q4:1999 to Q2:2013. We find direct evidence that sovereign credit re-ratings that lead to changes in risk-weights for capital adequacy requirements have become more significant since the implementation of Basel 2 rules for assessing banks’ credit risk under the standardized approach. This evidence is consistent with global banks acting via their international lending decisions to minimize required capital charges associated with the use of ratings-contingent regulation. We find no evidence to suggest that banking regulation induced foreign lending has heightened the perceived sovereign credit risks of recipient countries.

We develop a return variance decomposition model to distinguish the roles of different types of information and noise in stock price movements. We disentangle four components: noise, private firm-specific information revealed through trading, firm-specific information revealed through public sources and market-wide information. Overall, we find that 31% of the return variance is from noise, 24% from private firm-specific information, 37% from public firm-specific information and 8% from market-wide information. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a dramatic decline in noise and an increase in firm-specific information, consistent with increasing market efficiency. The Internet Appendix that accompanies this paper can be obtained here: https://bit.ly/3FcV9UR

We examine the effect of shareholder litigation rights on managers' acquisition decisions. Our experimental design exploits a U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling on July 2, 1999 that resulted in a reduction in shareholder class actions. We find that, since the ruling, firms in Ninth Circuit states acquire larger targets. Furthermore, acquirers' returns are lower in these states, especially for those with weaker corporate governance. Further analysis shows that value destruction is the result of managers' freedom to conduct empire-building acquisitions using overvalued equity. Overall, our findings indicate the importance of shareholder litigation as an external governance mechanism.