Ostensibly, the SEC's new round of regulatory activity is motivated by a bout of well-publicized business scandals and an explosive increase in financial innovations and instruments. Many critics of the “new” SEC question the proportionality and usefulness of the responses, which move the SEC well beyond reliance on disclosure and promotion of transparency. Others argue that more heavy-handed and far-reaching regulation is necessary given the vast changes in financial markets, the increasing importance of (largely unregulated) hedge funds and private equity, and corporate scandals that allege fraud and deception. This paper provides a rationale for studying recent regulatory changes and for addressing the overarching question of how to define the boundaries of SEC intervention in financial markets. The study provides an overview of papers in this special issue and concludes with suggestions for how policymakers can use research to better evaluate the costs and benefits of regulation.

Commonly used trade credit terms implicitly define a high interest rate that operates as an efficient screening device where information about buyer default risk is asymmetrically held. By offering trade credit, a seller can identify prospective defaults more quickly than if financial institutions were the sole providers of short-term financing. The information is valuable in cases where the seller has made nonsalvageable investments in buyers since it enables the seller to take actions to protect such investments.

Commonly used trade credit terms implicitly define a high interest rate that operates as an efficient screening device where information about buyer default risk is asymmetrically held. By offering trade credit, a seller can identify prospective defaults more quickly than if financial institutions were the sole providers of short‐term financing. The information is valuable in cases where the seller has made nonsalvageable investments in buyers since it enables the seller to take actions to protect such investments.

Sellers who extend trade credit to their business customers choose whether to integrate the management of trade credit or to enter into specialized factoring contracts. Using original data from a broad cross-section of firms we test a model of this decision. The model is based on a theory of the firm that stresses transactions costs (including information costs) as determinants of vertical integration. Consistent with expectations, we find that specificity of assets to the buyer-seller relationship is negatively related to the decision to factor and that factors are more likely to be used when information and monitoring costs are high.

We test hypotheses regarding risk taking behavior of competitors in settings characterized by one-on-one, single elimination tournaments. We draw data from 579 professional golf matches and over 18,000 holes from 2003 to 2013 in tournaments where match-play scoring is used rather than stroke-play. Because of the uniqueness of the data, we are able to provide clean empirical tests of how risk taking is affected by horizon effects (holes remaining), peer effects arising from heterogeneity in player abilities, match status (whether behind or ahead), and the difficulty of the task/project (hole). The findings are applicable to corporate settings where only a few rivals compete for a prize, such as a winning bid, a promotion, market share dominance, and patents. Other applications include litigation contests and political elections.

We use a database of recent high tech IPOs to estimate opportunity cost of capital for venture capital investors and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs face the risk-return tradeoff of the CAPM as the opportunity cost of holding a portfolio that necessarily is underdiversified. For early stage firms, we estimate the effects of underdiversification, industry, and financial maturity on opportunity cost. Assuming a one-year holding period, the entrepreneur's opportunity cost generally is two to four times as high as that of a well-diversified investor. With a 4.0% risk-free rate and 6.0% market risk premium, for the sample average, we estimate the cost of capital of a well-diversified investor to be 11.4%, which equates to 16.7% before the management fees and carried interest of a typical venture capital fund. For an entrepreneur with 25% of total wealth invested in the venture, our corresponding estimate of cost of capital is 40.0%.

We study corporate philanthropy using an original database that includes firm-level data on dollar giving, giving priorities, governance, and managerial involvement in giving programs. Results provide some support for the theory that giving enhances shareholder value, as firms in the same industry tend to adopt similar giving practices and firms that advertise more intensively also give more to charity. But much of our evidence indicates that agency costs play a prominent role in explaining corporate giving. Firms with larger boards of directors are associated with significantly more cash giving and with the establishment of corporate foundations. Consistent with effective monitoring by creditors, firms with higher debt-to-value ratios give less cash to charities and are less likely to establish foundations. The empirical work considers the impact of industry regulation on giving and controls for state philanthropy laws and fiduciary responsibility laws.

The price formation process of JASDAQ IPOs is more transparent than in the United States. The transparency facilitates analysis of important issues in the IPO literature—why offer prices only partially adjust to public information and adjust more fully to negative information, and why adjustments are related to initial returns. The evidence indicates that early price information conveys the underwriter's commitment to compensate investors for acquiring and/or disclosing information. Offer prices reflect pre‐IPO market values of public companies and implicit agreements between underwriters and issuers that originate well before the offering. Underadjustment of offer prices is substantially reversed in the aftermarket.

We use the IPOs of supply-chain partners as precipitating events and test for positive spillovers on private firms (the “IPO spillover hypothesis”). A trading partner’s IPO may benefit its suppliers through increased demand and its customers by reducing an input-related growth constraint. A newly public firm may also transmit additional liquidity to trading partners through trade credit practices. Using Japanese data on important relationships between IPO firms and their private suppliers and customers, we find that suppliers and customers experience significantly higher rates of growth in revenue, cash balances, and PP&E than do other private firms. The paper appears to be the first to document real and financial effects of positive liquidity shocks on supply-chain partners.