Institutions often offer a menu of contracts to consumers in an attempt to create a separating equilibrium that reveals borrower types and provides better pricing. We test the effectiveness of a specific set of contracts in the mortgage market: mortgage points. Points allow borrowers to exchange an upfront amount for a decrease in the mortgage rate. We document that, on average, points takers lose about $700. Also, points takers are less financially savvy (less educated, older), and they make mistakes on other dimensions (e.g., inefficiently refinancing their mortgages). Overall, our results show that borrowers overestimate how long they will stay with the mortgage.

This paper examines the effect of a regulatory action (the Home Valuation Code of Conduct) that was designed to reduce the incidence of inflated collateral valuations. We identify the impact of the regulation using a difference-in-difference identification strategy. Our baseline results confirm that the regulation reduced inflated valuations in refinance transactions by 16% in the large lender sample, compared to small lenders and a placebo sample. The effect is most significant in low-liquidity and low-distress markets, but not in other markets. We find that the regulation had a significant impact on loan to value ratio and interest rate, and it also led to a significant increase in defaults but a decrease in prepayments.

This paper adopts a novel approach to examine the roles of gender difference and intra-household economic power in mortgage signing order. We develop an “economic power” index based on relative economic power within the same-sex couple households. We then use this measure along with gender identity and other factors to explain signing order in different-gender couples. Our results suggest that, while pure economic power explains much of the observed signing order, gender difference plays an important role. Analysis exploiting regional variation reveals that gender difference in signing order is greater in states with a larger gender wage gap and red states whose residents predominantly vote for the Republican.

We examine the impact of fintech on firm labor demand, job turnover, and firm performance. Occupations with higher exposure to fintech experience a net decline in job postings and employment, though both complementary and substitutive effects emerge across different sectors. Fintech blurs traditional industry boundaries, creating demand for workers with a combination of finance and technology skills. In response, firms upskill through hiring, reallocate talent internally, and pivot innovation to new areas. As a result, firms are better equipped to absorb the shock than individual workers, with innovative firms even experiencing growth in employment, sales, and productivity upon fintech disruption.

We examine the ability of the government to impact mortgage refinancing activity and spur consumption by focusing on the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) that relaxed housing equity constraints by extending government credit guarantee on insufficiently collateralized refinanced mortgages. Difference-in-difference tests based on program eligibility criteria reveal a significant increase in refinancing activity by HARP. More than three million eligible borrowers with primarily fixed-rate mortgages refinanced under HARP, receiving an average reduction of 1.45% in interest rate ($3,000 in annual savings). Durable spending by borrowers increased significantly after refinancing. Regions more exposed to the program saw a relative increase in non-durable and durable consumer spending, a decline in foreclosure rates, and faster recovery in house prices. Competitive frictions in the refinancing market hampered the program’s impact: the take-up rate and annual savings among those who refinanced were reduced by 10–20%, with amplified effects for the most indebted borrowers.

We identify exposure to political risk by exploiting a unique variation around land lease extension protection after 2047 in Hong Kong’s housing market due to historical arrangements. Relative to properties that have been promised an extension protection, those with unprotected leases granted by the current government are sold at a discount of 8 percent; those with colonial leases suffer an additional discount of 8 percent. Incorporating estimated structural parameters that suggest an additional 20 percent ground rent after 2047, our model matches empirical discounts well across lease horizons. Discounts increase over time, particularly in areas with greater pessimism about the city’s future.