Knowledge that Transforms

Enthusiasts who hope for concessions from Great Britain in order to further an international bimetallic agreement would do well to con? sider whether there is any real ground to hope for even the opening of the Indian mints. In the first place, since the closing of the mints, the rupee has been maintained at a higher value than the value of the silver it contains (although not as high as the legal rate of i6d.). At present the fluctuations in exchange are not so extreme, and, therefore, not so productive of uncertainty in the budget as they were before June 26, 1893. To open the Indian mints without practically absolute cer? tainty of the future control over the world-price of silver would be to give up a present advantage for a future uncertainty. Unless the pro? moters of an international agreement can promise more than is likely to be believed, it is quite unlikely that the gains already accrued from the closing of the Indian mints will be sacrificed. The comparison between the rates of exchange on India (payable in India in rupees) and the price of the silver contents of a rupee is striking and suggestive. The rupee is now a token coin, circulating at a nominal value far above the value of its contents as bullion. Opening the mints would at once lower the value of the coined rupee (and the rate of exchange) to the value of the silver it contains; just as free coinage in the United States, or France, would bring the dollar, or the five-franc piece, to the worth of the bullion in each coin. The fluctuations of exchange are now on a higher level than those of silver; and opening the mints would bring a new disturbance. And as a compensation there is only the remote contingency that possibly enough states might unite to con? trol the world-value of silver. Conservative statesmen are not likely to rise to this fly.