Modern mutual fund families include more than active mutual funds (AMFs). AMFs in families with greater index mutual fund (IMF) presence generate higher category-adjusted gross returns. Performance is positively related to the levels of passive and active fees, suggesting moral hazard. Intrafamily competition from IMFs in the same Morningstar category incentivizes managers to exert effort. Financial resources do not contribute to the performance effect. Cross-trading with IMFs occurs with some positive effect on performance. ETFs have no impact on performance. IMFs reduce flow-performance sensitivity and flow volatility of AMFs in the family. IMFs and ETFs uniquely contribute to expense pressure.

Material private information transmits through social networks. Using manually collected information on networks of alumni reunion cohorts, we show that hedge fund managers connected to directors of firms engaged in merger deals increase call-option holdings on target firms before deal announcements. Effects are larger when reunion events for connected cohorts occur just before announcements. Independent directors, directors with short tenure, and directors with low stock ownership are more likely to transmit information. Our results are robust to confounding factors and alternative specifications. These findings highlight the role of social networks as channels of private-information dissemination.