The economics of partnerships have been of enduring interest to economists, yet it is not clear what profit sharing within a private partnership should look like. We examine over 700 private equity partnerships and show that the allocation of fund economics to individual partners varies drastically, even among the most senior partners, and appears divorced from past success as an investor, being instead related to status as a founder. A smaller share of carried interest and ownership—and inequality in fund economics more generally—is associated with departures of senior partners which, in turn is negatively related to the funds’ ability to raise additional capital.

We examine 20 years of direct private equity investments by seven large institutions. These direct investments perform better than public market indices, especially buyout investments and those made in the 1990s. Outperformance by the direct investments, however, relative to the corresponding private equity fund benchmarks is limited and concentrated among buyout transactions. Co-investments underperform the corresponding funds with which they co-invest, due to an apparent adverse selection of transactions available to these investors, while solo transactions outperform fund benchmarks. Investors’ ability to resolve information problems appears to be an important driver of solo deal outcomes.

Does private equity (PE) contribute to financial fragility during economic crises? The proliferation of poorly structured transactions during booms may increase the vulnerability of the economy to downturns. During the 2008 crisis, PE-backed companies decreased investments less than did their peers and experienced greater equity and debt inflows, higher asset growth, and increased market share. These effects are especially strong among financially constrained companies and those whose PE investors had more resources at the crisis onset. In a survey, PE firms report being active investors during the crisis and spending more time working with their portfolio companies. Received July 19, 2017; editorial decision March 7, 2018 by Editor Wei Jiang.

Bank-affiliated private equity groups account for 30% of all private equity investments. Their market share is highest during peaks of the private equity market, when the parent banks arrange more debt financing for in-house transactions yet have the lowest exposure to debt. Using financing terms and ex post performance, we show overall that banks do not make superior equity investments to those of stand-alone private equity groups. Instead, they appear to expand their private equity engagement to take advantage of the credit market booms, while capturing private benefits from cross-selling of other banking services.

This article documents the fact that ventures funded by two successful angel groups experience superior outcomes to rejected ventures: They have improved survival, exits, employment, patenting, Web traffic, and financing. We use strong discontinuities in angel- funding behavior over small changes in their collective interest levels to implement a regression discontinuity approach. We confirm the positive effects for venture operations, with qualitative support for a higher likelihood of successful exits. On the other hand, there is no difference in access to additional financing around the discontinuity. This might suggest that financing is not a central input of angel groups.

We analyze how contractibility affects contract design. A major concern when designing research agreements is that researchers use their funding to subsidize other projects. We show that, when research activities are not contractible, an option contract is optimal. The financing firm obtains the option to terminate the agreement and, in case of termination, broad property rights. The threat of termination deters researchers from cross-subsidization, and the cost of exercising the termination option deters the financing firm from opportunistic termination. We test this prediction using 580 biotechnology research agreements. Contracts with termination options are more common when research is non-contractible. (JEL D86, L65, O31, O34)

ABSTRACT Financial economists have intensely debated the performance of IPOs using data after the formation of Nasdaq. This paper sheds light on this controversy by undertaking a large, out‐of‐sample study: We examine the performance for five years after listing of 3,661 U.S. IPOs from 1935 to 1972. The sample displays some underperformance when event‐time buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns are used. The underperformance disappears, however, when cumulative abnormal returns are utilized. A calendar‐time analysis shows that over the entire period, IPOs return as much as the market. The intercepts in CAPM and Fama–French regressions are insignificantly different from zero, suggesting no abnormal performance.