We develop a theory of optimal bank leverage in which the benefit of debt in inducing loan monitoring is balanced against the benefit of equity in attenuating risk shifting. However, faced with socially costly correlated bank failures, regulators bail out creditors. Anticipation of this generates multiple equilibria, including one with systemic risk in which banks use excessive leverage to fund correlated, inefficiently risky loans. Limiting leverage and resolving both moral hazards—insufficient loan monitoring and asset substitution—requires a novel two-tiered capital requirement, including a “special capital account” that is unavailable to creditors upon failure.

I present a theory of organizational higher purpose in which, in addition to profits, the firms’ owners and employees care about a purpose that guides decisions but transcends business goals. This purpose sacrifices profits but serves a greater good that generates positive utility for the owners and employees. Some purpose-driven firms insure employees against layoffs and may pay employees more or less than firms not offering such insurance. Whether purpose-driven firms offering layoff insurance pay employees more or less than purpose-driven firms not offering this insurance depends on the owner’s purpose-linked utility relative to the employee’s.

This review of the literature on the 2007-2009 crisis discusses the precrisis conditions, the crisis triggers, the crisis events, the real effects, and the policy responses to the crisis. The precrisis conditions contributed to the housing price bubble and the subsequent price decline that led to a counterparty-risk crisis in which liquidity shrank due to insolvency concerns. The policy responses were influenced both by the initial belief that it was a market-wide liquidity crunch and the subsequent learning that insolvency risk was a major driver. I suggest directions for future research and possible regulatory changes.

I examine the effects of venture capital backing on the corporate governance of the entrepreneurial firm at the time of transition from private to public ownership. Using a selection model framework that instruments for venture backing with variations in the supply of venture capital, I conduct three sets of tests comparing corporate governance in venture- and non–venture-backed initial public offering (IPO) firms. Venture-backed firms have lower levels of earnings management, more positive reactions to the adoption of shareholder rights agreements, and more independent board structures than similar non–venture-backed firms, consistent with better governance. These effects are not common to all pre-IPO large shareholders.

This paper studies the optimal combination of debt and dividend commitments in an agency model of the firm. Financial policy is relevant because ex-post information asymmetryrequires managerial rewards to depend on the ability to meet financial commitments. If perquisite or inside information problems exist in isolation, debt-based incentives as assumed inprevious studies result endogenously. If the problems exist simultaneously, dividends can beoptimal even when they appear excessively costly as a signal and unduly lenient as a disciplining device. The reason is that the set of dynamically consistent rewards increases when debt commitments are augmented with dividend commitments, and a larger set of ex-post rewards is more valuable as ex-ante decisions become more complex.

Data on firm-loan-level daily credit line drawdowns in the United States expose a corporate “dash for cash” induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first phase of the crisis, which was characterized by extreme precaution and heightened aggregate risk, all firms drew down bank credit lines and raised cash levels. In the second phase, which followed the adoption of stabilization policies, only the highest-rated firms switched to capital markets to raise cash. Consistent with the risk of becoming a fallen angel, the lowest-quality BBB-rated firms behaved more similarly to non-investment grade firms. The observed corporate behavior reveals the significant impact of credit risk on corporate cash holdings. (JEL G01, G14, G32, G35) Received July 13, 2020; editorial decision July 17, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul

Given the complex and controversial nature of short-selling regulation, we review the academic literature and provide insights for policy makers and academics. We organize the complex history of short-selling regulation into three areas: trading restrictions, securities lending regulations, and disclosure requirements. We identify, analyze, and discuss 45 distinct regulations promulgated from 1896 to 2021, primarily by reviewing the academic literature and the data sources employed. We provide several insights regarding the effectiveness of regulatory approaches and the wider impact of short-selling regulation on markets.

We conduct a field experiment, based on a registered report accepted by the Journal of Accounting Research , to test performance effects of setting a high reference point for peer‐performance comparison. Relative to providing the median as a reference point for online students to compare themselves to, providing the top quartile: damps performance for those below the median, boosts performance for those between the median and top quartile, and, in the case of outcome but not process comparison, boosts performance for those above the top quartile. We do not find that either reference point yields a greater average performance effect. However, providing the more effective reference point in each partition of initial performance yields a 40% greater performance effect than providing either reference point uniformly. Students access the online courses intermittently over the span of a year. Our effects derive from small portions of our treatment groups—5% in the case of process comparison and 26% in the case of outcome comparison—who accessed treatment and who were, on average, more active leading up to and during our intervention.

We study the liquidity demand of large settlement banks in the UK and its effect on the money markets before and during the subprime crisis of 2007–08. We find that the liquidity demand of large settlement banks experienced a 30% increase in the period immediately following August 9 2007, the day when money markets froze, igniting the crisis. Following this shift, liquidity demand had a precautionary nature in that it rose on days of high payment activity and for banks with greater credit risk. This caused overnight interbank rates to rise, an effect virtually absent in the precrisis period.