Knowledge that Transforms

This paper reports empirical evidence of systematic cross-locale variation in the degree of division of labor among physicians. A theoretical model--based on an individual producer's trade-off between increasing returns and falling marginal revenue within each activity--motivates the empirical tests. At two levels of aggregation, specialization is correlated with local demand shifters for medical services. At the individual level, I find systematic differences in the range of procedures performed within a specialty class. General practitioners working fewer hours, practicing in more populated counties, or practicing in countries with more elderly produce a narrower range of procedures.

[This paper provides a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and the theory of contractual institutions. Like market institutions, legislative institutions reflect two key components: the goals or preferences of individuals (here, representatives seeking reelection) and the relevant transactions costs. We present three conclusions. First, we show how the legislative institutions enforce bargains among legislators. Second, we explain why, given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures, specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange. Third, our approach shows how the committee system limits the types of coalitions that may form on a particular issue.]

The employment relationship with employees' ability and their actions both private information (thus combining adverse selection with moral hazard) is modeled as a repeated game with self-enforcing contracts being perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under termination contracts, the equilibrium contract structure consists of a hierarchy of ranks, finite in number even though ability is continuous. Reputation acts as an effective device for worker discipline without the need for involuntary unemployment. Selection by bonding is not, in general, incentive compatible, but selection by promotion of employees through the ranks is. Many other features correspond to observed employment structures.

Health concerns are thought by many to have shifted consumption away from red meats, though econometric evidence is mixed. Testing for structural change is difficult, especially when one time series is used for both estimating demand equations and testing their stability. Specification errors may suggest a shift where none has occurred. Using nonparametric demand analysis, we find that meat consumption patterns in the United States and Australia can be explained using only relative prices and expenditures. Only imposing particular functional forms can reverse the conclusion, suggesting that specification errors in econometric demand studies can account for findings of taste changes.

[The paper develops a model that shows the effects of rational expectations, and of efficient markets, on public utility regulation. It is shown that the feedback from investor expectations to regulatory behavior, together with investor expectations that take account of this feedback, basically alters the consequences of regulatory decisions. The analysis examines the effects of a deviation between the allowed rate of return and the cost of capital, with both perfect and imperfect investor foresight. It also assesses the consequences of differing expected growth rates. Conclusions are drawn for the effects of regulatory decisions on resource misallocation and of regulatory lag on incentives.]

Quarterly data for the period from 1961 to 1986 suggest that the real quantity of money (defined as M2) demanded relative to income is positively related to the deflated price of equities (Standard and Poor's composite) three quarters earlier and negatively related to the contemporaneous real stock price. The positive relation appears to reflect a wealth effect; the negative, a substitution effect. The wealth effect appears stronger than the substitution effect. The volume of transactions has an appreciable effect on M1 velocity but not on M2 velocity. Annual data for a century suggest that the apparent dominance of the wealth effect is the exception, not the rule.

Salaries of academic economists are studied to determine if individuals receive differential returns to publishing articles of varying quality and to coauthored versus single-authored articles. Estimates based on detailed data and a flexible nonlinear least-squares procedure indicate that substantial returns to quality exist and that an individual's return from a coauthored paper with n authors is approximately 1/n times that of a single-authored paper.

The extent to which deviations from covered interest parity can be attributed to transactions costs has been exaggerated in the economic literature because the swap market in foreign exchange has been ignored. It is shown that such deviations should be no greater than the lowest of the transactions costs in one of three markets: the swap market or either of the two relevant securities markets. This reconciles the theory with the data, which show spreads of no more than a few basis points. However, the empirical results have no direct bearing on the conventional market efficiency hypothesis.

[This paper outlines a procedure for estimating a general index of technical change within the context of a quite general production technology. Specifically, when panel data are available for firms in an industry, time-specific dummies can be combined in a nonlinear estimation procedure to yield a general index of technical change that may be both nonneutral and scale augmenting. This approach offers numerous advantages over the traditional time trend representation of technical change. For example, the general index can serve as the basis for analysis of the determinants of technical change. Results for a sample of 30 electric utilities over the period 1951-78 show that the productivity decline of the 1970s can be attributed primarily to sulphur oxide restrictions and secularly declining capacity utilization due to rapidly increasing peak-load demands.]

[This paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long-term interests in order to boost current profits. If stockholders are imperfectly informed, temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued, increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price; hence the managerial concern with current bottom line. The magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors, including the attitudes and beliefs of shareholders, the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information, and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms.]