Knowledge that Transforms

This review argues that Allan Meltzer's account of the Federal Reserve between 1913 and 1951 complements Friedman and Schwartz's in their Monetary History. Meltzer emphasizes policy making within the system, rather than the evolution of the money supply and its effects on the economy. He stresses the uncertainty of the Fed's independence before the 1951 Accord, and the effects of economic ideas, notably the real bills and Riefler-Burgess doctrines, on policy. Many virtues in the book are noted, and one weakness, namely a failure to explain why inadequate ideas became dominant within the Fed when sounder alternatives were available in contemporary monetary thought.

We survey the evidence bearing on measurement error in the CPI and provide our best estimate of the magnitude of CPI bias. We also identify a weighting bias in the CPI that has not been previously discussed in the literature. In total, we estimate that the CPI overstates the change in the cost of living by about 0.6 percentage point per year, with a confidence interval that ranges from 0.1 to 1.2 percentage points. Roughly half of this bias is accounted for by the CPI's inability to fully capture the welfare improvement from quality change and the introduction of new items. Our bias estimate is smaller than that found in several earlier studies, in part because the BLS has recently made a variety of improvements to its procedures; our study highlights several potential areas for further improvement.

This essay reviews Networks and Markets, edited by James E. Rauch and Alessandra Casella. This book provides a useful vehicle for clarifying the main conceptual and operational issues facing the growing study of economic networks. Three types of networks are discussed: networks as concentrated or patterned exchange; as primordial relations; and, the most general, networks as structures of mutual orientation. An overview is provided of the challenges faced by research on the economic implications of three types of networks. The strengths and weaknesses of current research on economic networks are examined via a review of the contributions in the book.

Edward Fiske and Helen Ladd's review of market-based educational reforms in New Zealand are assessed in light of recent developments. We agree that predicted benefits were overstated, that there were both losers and winners, and that educational nirvana did not result. In our view, however, the main impact was to make schools' problems more transparent, creating discomforting pressures and attempts to undermine this transparency. We examine responses to changes in zoning laws, the effects of socioeconomic status on observed outcomes, signalling and value-added behavior, and school accountability. We find that educational reforms produce substantial short-term changes, largely on the demand-side.

Two distinct but interrelated issues are investigated here. The first concerns Sraffa's critical role in contemporary philosophy through his pivotal influence on Wittgenstein. The intellectual origins of this profound influence can be traced to the philosophical interests of the activist political circle in Italy (clustered around the journal L'Ordine Nuovo) to which both Sraffa and Antonio Gramsci belonged. The second inquiry concerns the influence of Sraffa's philosophical views on his economics. Sraffa's economic contributions can be much better understood by paying attention to the way Sraffa changed the nature of the questions asked, rather than seeking different answers to already established questions.

It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule, either a general targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for (the forecasts of) the target variables to be fulfilled), essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables. Targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extra-model information, are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules, and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium.

It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule, either a general targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for (the forecasts of) the target variables to be fulfilled), essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables.Targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extra-model information, are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules, and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium.