Agency and Efficiency in Nonprofit Organizations: The Case of "Specific Health Focus" Charities
[This article relates the efficiency of nonprofit organizations to the composition of their board of trustees. Following arguments by Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) and Williamson (1983), we conjecture that nonprofit organizations are more efficient if their board of trustees have a larger proportion of outsider trustees rather than insider (employee) trustees since the former are presumed to have a greater incentive to monitor the organization and the latter are presumed to have a greater incentive to consume perquisites. This conjecture is tested empirically for a sample of 72 charities with a specific health focus, with respect to both the technical and allocative efficiency of the organization. Technical efficiency indices were derived by using data envelopment analysis (DEA) under various assumptions concerning the industry production technology, including the assumption that charity outputs are not substitutable for each other. These indices are reasonably well measured since the data included information on volunteer labor, a necessary input for charity services. To test the conjecture that the technical efficiency of the organization is affected by the composition of the board of trustees, the estimated indices of technical efficiency were regressed on the board's proportion of insider trustees and the organization's debt-value ratio. The conjectured relationship was not confirmed by the data. As an additional test, the proportion of insider trustees was replaced by the ratio of insider-trustee remuneration to total labor remuneration, the argument being that the greater the relative remuneration received by the insider trustees, the more capable they might be in appropriating perquisites of all types. As before, the results did not confirm the conjectured relationship, leading us to conclude that the technical efficiency of nonprofits is not affected by the composition of the board of trustees. To determine the relationship, if any, between the allocative efficiency of the organization and the composition of the board of trustees, charity costs were multiplied by the technical efficiency index so that any remaining cost inefficiencies are allocative in nature. This adjusted cost was then regressed on the proportion of insider trustees on the board (or the proportion of insider-trustee remuneration) and the organization's debt-value ratio. The conjectured relationship between allocative efficiency and the composition of the board of trustees was also not confirmed by the data.]