Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines fiscal policy forecasts prepared for the Federal Open Market Committee and its influence on U.S. monetary policy. The forecasts contain useful information beyond that in the CBO’s forecasts. Fiscal forecast errors are only weakly correlated with forecast errors for inflation and output growth, but those for the budget surplus are highly correlated with those for the unemployment rate and the output gap. Some fiscal variables can also account for a significant fraction of the “exogenous” changes in the federal funds rate target that Romer and Romer (2004) studied, consistent with the board’s statements on the importance of fiscal policy.

We examine the housing market and residential mobility changes that occur soon after a Title 1 school fails to achieve adequate yearly progress (AYP) in Charlotte, North Carolina. Students within attendance zones of failing schools are given priority in lotteries for oversubscribed schools, potentially increasing the attractiveness of living in a failing school attendance zone. We find that housing prices, home buyer income, and the probability of attending a nonassigned school increase in the highest-quality neighborhoods within failing school attendance zones. Our results are driven largely by the behavior of new residents.

Using data on women’s choice of hospital for childbirth in Florida, we find that women return to the same hospital approximately 70% of the time. We separate explanations of switching costs and unobserved preference heterogeneity using a panel data fixed effects estimator and find that switching costs account for approximately 40% of the demand effects of a lagged dependent variable. The welfare effects of excluding a hospital from a payer’s network are smaller in the short run but higher in the long run, given our estimates of switching costs, and the dynamic effects of entry on competition are significantly smaller.

This paper studies the political influence of individual firms on congressional decisions to suspend tariffs on U.S. imports of intermediate goods. We develop a legislative bargaining model in which firms influence legislators by transmitting information about the value of protection, using verbal messages and lobbying expenditures. Model estimation using firmlevel data on tariff suspension bills and lobbying expenditures reveals that the probability a suspension is granted decreases with each additional firm that expresses opposition. This effect is significantly larger than that of either opponent or proponent lobbying due to the greater information content of verbal opposition and legislative bargaining costs.

We provide evidence that choices over small-stakes bets are consistent with assumptions of some payoff calibration paradoxes. We then exploit the existence of detailed information on individual wealth of our experimental subjects in Denmark and directly estimate risk attitudes and the degree of asset integration. We discover that behavior is consistent with partial, rather than full, asset integration. The implied risk attitudes from estimating these specifications indicate risk premiums and certainty equivalents that are a priori plausible. This theory and evidence suggest one constructive solution to payoff calibration paradoxes.

This study assesses whether workplace pensions help individuals overcome knowledge barriers to saving for retirement. Using administrative data from Canada and exploiting unique features of the pension system, I find compelling evidence that each $1 contributed to workplace pensions partially crowds out other retirement saving by approximately $0.50—among interior savers—in a regression kink design, centering on unionized workers for methodological reasons. Further analysis indicates that active versus passive decisions are influenced by education, exploiting compulsory schooling reforms for identification. I conclude by showing that pension and education reform are both viable mechanisms for boosting saving from a life cycle perspective.

We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization, and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur, agents’ uncertainty about the macroeconomy remains contained, and welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, uncertainty eventually accelerates and welfare declines. Announcing that inflation stabilization will be temporarily abandoned raises uncertainty. However, these announcements lower policy uncertainty and curb inflationary beliefs at the end of the policy. For the United States, enhancing transparency raises welfare.

We exploit a quasi-natural experiment of military draftees in Russia during World War I to examine the effects of a massive, negative labor shock on agricultural production. Employing a novel district-level panel data set, we find that mass mobilization produces a dramatic decrease in cultivated area. Surprisingly, farms with communal land tenure exhibit greater resilience to the labor shock than private farms. The resilience stems from peasants reallocating labor in favor of the commune because of the increased attractiveness of its nonmarket access to land and social insurance. Our results support an institutional explanation of factor misallocation in agriculture.

Ambiguity attitudes have been prominently used in economic models, but we still know little about their demographic correlates or their generalizability beyond the West. We analyze the ambiguity attitudes of almost 3,000 students across thirty countries. For gains, we find ambiguity aversion everywhere, while ambiguity aversion is much weaker for losses. Ambiguity attitudes change systematically with probabilities for both gains and losses. Much of the between-country variation can be explained through a fewmacroeconomic characteristics. In contrast, we find massive unexplained variation at the individual level. We also find much unexplained heterogeneity in individual responses to different decision tasks.

In speedboat racing in Japan, men and women compete under the same conditions and are randomly assigned to mixed-sex or single-sex groups for each race. We use a sample of over 140,000 individual-level records to examine how male-dominated circumstances affect women’s racing performance. Our fixed-effects estimates reveal that women’s race time is slower in mixed-sex than all-women races, whereas men’s race time is faster in mixed-sex than men-only races. The same result is found for place in race. Moreover, in mixed-sex races, men are more aggressive, as proxied by lane changing, than women in spite of the risk of being penalized for rule infringement.