Knowledge that Transforms

[The existence of equilibrium and Pareto optimal allocations in economies with an infinite number of commodities is studied. It is shown that any topology stronger than the Mackey topology might lead to the nonexistence of nontrivial Pareto optimal allocations. I.e., there exists a well behaved economy with preferences that are continuous in this topology and without individually rational Pareto optimal allocations. A converse of this theorem, a slight modification of Bewley's [2] existence of equilibrium theorem, is also proved. Using a characterization of the Mackey topology in terms of impatience of consumers, due to Brown and Lewis [3], an interpretation of the theorem above is given: a topology is such that continuity with respect to it implies existence of nontrivial Pareto optimal allocations if and only if it also implies impatience on the part of the consumers.]

On montre a partir de l'evidence de Monte Carlo que les differences dans la forme fonctionnelle des restrictions non lineaires sont importantes dans les petites tailles d'echantillons

[Rational expectations equilibria are analyzed as incentive compatible mechanisms. The sense in which they can be implemented is made precise. Then, a welfare analysis of these equilibria is carried out within the class of mechanisms having the same incentive compatibility properties and the same communication constraints.]

[We apply the third-order efficient method of estimation to the estimation problem of a system of structural equations in econometrics. The maximum likelihood estimator (hereafter m.l.e.) of structural equations is proved to give uniformly higher probability of concentration about true values than any regular best asymptotically normal estimator, if its asymptotic bias is properly adjusted. For instance, the full-information or limited-information m.l.e give asymptotically uniformly higher probability of concentration than the three-stage or two-stage least-squares estimators, given that these estimators are adjusted to have the same biases. The same result holds for he subsystem m.l.e. We prove the asymptotic completeness of Fuller's modified estimator. Asymptotic expansions of the distributions of the full-information m.l., subsystem m.l., and limited-information m.l. estimators are derived to terms of order O(T extasciicircum-1). Our general theorem is also applied to the multi-equation seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model.]

[The first part of this paper considers the interaction between productive and nonproductive savings in a growing economy. It employs an overlapping generations model with capital accumulation and various types of rents, and gives necessary and efficient conditions for the existence of an aggregate bubble. The second part is a series of thoughts on the definition, nature, and consequences of asset bubbles. First, it derives some implications of bubbles for tests of asset pricing. Second, it demonstrates the specificity of money as an asset and shows that there is a fundamental dichtotomy in its formalization. Third, it discusses inefficiencies of price bubbles. Fourth, it shows that the financial definition of a bubble is not satisfactory for some assets.]

The NTU (Non-Transferable Utility) Value is a solution concept for multiperson cooperative games in which utility is not transferable (games without side payments). Introduced by Shapley in (1969), it generalizes his (1953) value for TU (Transferable Utility) games. Many economic contexts are more naturally modelled by NTU than by TU games; and indeed, the NTU value has been applied with some success to a variety of economic and economic-political models. Two well-known applications are Nash's solutions (1950, 1953) for the bargaining problem and for two-person cooperative games, both of which are instances of the NTU value. In this paper, the author offers an axiomatization of the NTU value. Like any axiomatization, it should enable us to understand the concept better, and hence to focus discussion. One can now view the NTU value as defined by the axioms, with the treatment in Shapley (1969) serving as a formula or method of calculation. Thus the NTU value joins the ranks of the TU value and Nash's solution to the bargaining problem, each of which is defined by axioms, but usually calculated by a formula -- a formula whose intuitive significance is not, on the face of it, entirely clear.

Analyse de la structure des preferences intertemporelles, necessaire pour obtenir une planification consistante

Examines the sequences of economies constructed by successive sampling from any characteristics of agents. In this paper author considers closeness of commodity bundles to demand sets, dependency of the agents bundles on convexity, relationship between core allocations and demand sets.