Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the effects of idiosyncratic accounting information on a firm's cost of capital. By embedding a moral hazard problem into a multifirm asset‐pricing model, I show that moral hazard distorts the sharing of idiosyncratic risk but does not affect the sharing of systematic risk in the economy. A firm‐level improvement in idiosyncratic information reduces the firm's cost of capital even though it does not affect the implied cost of capital inferred from publicly traded shares. Moreover, an economy‐level improvement in idiosyncratic information reduces the risk premium for idiosyncratic risk but increases the risk premium for systematic risk, resulting in an ambiguous net effect on the firm's cost of capital. These results provide alternative explanations for the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between information quality and the cost of capital.

This study examines the rather controversial practice of managerial hedging, which allows CEOs to delink their compensation from stock price performance. We presume that boards are aware of these practices and adjust the weights placed on accounting‐based and stock‐based performance measures in executive compensation contracts to mitigate the problem. Empirically, we find that, in the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, accounting‐based performance measures receive more weight, whereas stock‐based performance measures receive less weight in determining executive compensation. Moreover, these results are more pronounced when managerial hedging needs are high. Regarding the effects of earnings management resulting from accounting‐based incentives, we find that good auditing and strong governance mechanisms strengthen the benefit of placing more weight on accounting‐based performance measures. Taken together, our findings suggest that corporate boards shift the relative weights of performance measures in compensation contracts in response to managerial hedging opportunities, which is consistent with optimal contracting.

We empirically examine whether adopting a uniform set of accounting standards mitigates information frictions in financial markets and facilitates market integration. Using a difference‐in‐difference design, we find that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS local stock returns incorporate more global information and at a faster speed. The effect of IFRS adoption is stronger in countries where there are larger improvements in accounting comparability and for firms with a larger increase in foreign ownership. Overall, our results suggest that accounting standards harmonization facilitates financial market integration.

This study uses a confidential data set of firms assigned to the Internal Revenue Service's Coordinated Industry Case (CIC) program to examine the effect of audit certainty on firms' tax reporting behavior. We first model the determinants of assignment to the program. Although the ability and incentive to avoid taxes are related to CIC assignment, we find that the IRS assigns firms primarily based on size and complexity. We then test whether audit certainty has a detectable effect on tax payments. Our results show that tax payments do not change when firms enter the CIC program, suggesting the CIC program does not have higher deterrence or enforcement effects relative to the IRS's standard selection and audit process for large corporations not included in the CIC program. However, supplemental analysis suggests that audit certainty does alter managers' expectations regarding future tax payments. Our paper provides new empirical evidence on the strategic game between the taxpayer and the tax authority and has important implications for tax authorities as they consider the costs and benefits of certain audit programs.

We study whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to accounting earnings and how the impact of IFRS adoption varies with country‐level institutions and firm‐level incentives. We find that CEO turnover responds more to a firm's accounting performance after adoption. This increase in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity is concentrated in countries with stronger enforcement of financial reporting and is more prominent for mandatory adopters that have strong firm‐level compliance incentives. In addition, we link the change in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity directly to accounting changes due to IFRS adoption and find a stronger adoption effect when firms report large overall accounting changes and large de‐recognition of loss provisions upon adoption. Some of the above findings are sensitive to the exclusion of UK firms, which account for more than half of our sample.

Reported deficiencies continue to persist in audits of fair value measurements and other complex accounting estimates (hereafter, “FVMs”), despite improvements in auditor performance observed by regulators. The persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs suggests that factors underlying this trend may be more complicated and multidimensional than previously suggested by regulators and academic research, which has focused largely on auditors' unsatisfactory performance as the principal source of reported deficiencies. Drawing from the judgment and decision‐making expertise literature, we gather field‐based data from audit experts to identify additional factors that are likely to be contributing to differences of opinion between audit and inspection experts and the persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs. We find evidence that audit experts interpret standards and evaluate audit evidence differently than inspectors, and thus perceive there to be a gap between what auditors and inspectors regard as sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support audits of FVMs (hereafter, “FVM gap”). Moreover, results highlight several areas in audits of FVMs where differences of opinion exist between auditor and inspector experts regarding what constitutes a reported deficiency. Within the contexts we examine, our results identify additional factors, beyond deficient auditor performance, that may contribute to the FVM gap. We also report audit partners' recommendations for ways to reduce the FVM gap and suggest avenues for future research. Gaining a more complete understanding of sources contributing to reported deficiencies will help regulators, standard setters, audit firms, and academics to identify ways to reduce the FVM gap and reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs.

We ask whether the quality of internal information matters for investment decisions. We predict that investment is more sensitive to internal profit signals and less sensitive to external price signals when managers have higher‐quality internal information. Consistent with recent theoretical and empirical research, we proxy for internal information quality using observable information properties. We find that the sensitivity of investment to profitability is increasing, while the sensitivity of investment to market‐to‐book is decreasing in internal information quality. Our focus on internal information and decision making offers new and unique insights on the importance of information quality and complements the growing literature on the role of external reporting quality in reducing financing frictions.

The trade‐off literature asserts that managers weigh the direct benefits of tax avoidance against the associated nontax costs. This literature implies each firm has a unique optimal level of tax avoidance that balances these costs and benefits. Our study is the first to document how quickly the average firm moves toward its optimal level of tax avoidance. We find that the typical firm converges toward its optimum at a rate that ranges from approximately 69 to 84 percent over a three‐year period, depending upon model specifications. Consistent with asymmetric levels of frictions across the tax avoidance distribution, we find the speed of adjustment is greater for firms below their optimal level of tax avoidance than for firms above. We perform additional cross‐sectional analyses to provide insight into some of the frictions that prevent firms from adjusting completely to their optimal level of tax avoidance. We generally find growth firms exhibit slower adjustment speeds and provide limited evidence that both multinational firms and income‐mobile firms exhibit faster adjustment speeds.

Prior literature suggests that the market underreacts to the positive correlation in a typical firm's seasonal earnings changes, which leads to a post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) in prices. We examine the market reaction for a distinct set of firms whose seasonal earnings changes are uncorrelated and show that the market incorrectly assumes that the earnings changes of these firms are positively correlated. We also document that positive (negative) seasonal earnings changes in the current quarter are associated with negative (positive) abnormal returns in the next quarter. Thus, we observe a reversal of abnormal returns, consistent with a systematic overreaction to earnings, rather than the previously documented PEAD. Additional analysis indicates that financial analysts similarly overestimate the autocorrelation of these firms, although to a lesser extent. We also find that the magnitude of overestimation and the subsequent price reversal are inversely related to the richness of the information environment. Our results challenge the notion that investors recognize but consistently underestimate earnings correlation and provide a new perspective on the inability of prices to fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. That is, we show that investors predictably overestimate correlation when it is lacking, but underestimate it when it is present.

Using a proprietary data set consisting of all private firm audit engagements in 2000 from one Big 4 firm in Belgium, we investigate (i) whether audit office industry scale is associated with a reduction of total, partner, and staff audit hours and thus with efficiency gains triggered by organizational learning from servicing more clients in an industry and (ii) whether the extent of efficiency pass‐on from the auditor to its clients depends on the audit firm's market power. We find that auditor office industry scale is associated with efficiency gains and a reduction of the variable costs (i.e., fewer total audit hours, partner hours, and staff hours), ceteris paribus. Our results also suggest that, on average, realized efficiencies are entirely passed on, as evidenced by a nonsignificant effect of auditor industry scale on the auditor's billing rate. Furthermore, we find that the extent of the efficiency pass‐on decreases with the market power of the audit firm in the industry market segment as we document a higher billing rate for auditors with high market power (versus low market power). In addition, we find that the lower audit hours associated with auditor industry scale do not compromise audit quality.