Knowledge that Transforms

Discretionary bonus adjustments allow managers to restore the alignment of employee effort and compensation when bonus amounts are based on noisy objective performance measures. The implications of discretionary adjustments for employees' future efforts and fairness perceptions present important trade‐offs for managers to consider. Adjustments may be used to motivate different types of effort in future periods, but may also create perceptions of unfairness among employees who are not affected by negative events. This study examines the joint influence of the likelihood of future negative uncontrollable events and compensation interdependence (i.e., the extent to which one employee's compensation influences others' compensation) on managers' willingness to make adjustments for the effect of a negative uncontrollable event on a single employee. In our experiment, we manipulate the likelihood of future uncontrollable events and whether bonuses are determined individually or are drawn from a shared bonus pool. Results show that managers are less willing to adjust when the likelihood of future events is high to avoid setting a precedent, thereby motivating employees to adapt to changing conditions. We also find that managers are less willing to adjust, regardless of event likelihood, when compensation interdependence is high, to avoid demotivating unaffected employees. Finally, we find that participants' general attitudes toward compensation significantly influence their adjustment decisions beyond the effects of our independent variables. Our results highlight the unique nature of discretionary adjustments, help explain findings from previous research, and demonstrate important considerations managers must make when using the flexibility provided to them in pay‐for‐performance contracts.

Responding to calls to instate the visual in accounting history research, this study utilizes photographic images to reveal the role of accounting in the attempt to preserve an ideal (ruralism) and an institution (the family farm) in the United States . These elemental features of the American way of life were threatened during the interwar depression, resulting in governmental programs to secure their restoration. The analysis of official imagery reveals how the accounting prescriptions attending state intervention in agriculture were deemed conducive to the fortification of the economic, social and political foundations of agrarian living. Documentary photographs propagated the notion that accounting facilitated companionate marriage and the inclusive family. They also suggested that accounting was a focus for encouraging the communitarian endeavor, democratic participation and receptivity to state interventionism considered necessary to preserve the rural mode of living.

The above article has been retracted at the request of authors Robert Libby and Hun‐Tong Tan, in agreement with the Editor‐in‐Chief, Patricia C. O'Brien, the copyright holder, the Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA), and Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Bentley University conducted an investigation confirming that Dr. J. E. Hunton, while a faculty member at Bentley University and without the knowledge of his co‐authors, engaged in research misconduct, specifically data fabrication. Dr. Hunton provided the data used in the above study, and did not respond to a request for comment. Based on Bentley's initial report and further investigation into details specific to this paper, we conclude that the validity of the data cannot be confirmed. To correct the academic literature and maintain standards of academic integrity, we therefore retract the paper. The article was published online in Contemporary Accounting Research on 13 May 2010, in Wiley Online ( wileyonlinelibrary.com ). Reference Tan , H.‐T. , R. Libby , and J. E. Hunton . 2010 . . Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (): 187 – 208 . doi: 10.1111/j.1911‐3846.2010.01006.x

We investigate how auditors learn the technical aspects of their professional role while performing client engagements, and how that learning process has been shaped by changes in societal, economic, and regulatory forces. Prior studies explicitly recognize that auditors need social skills and demeanor consistent with professional norms as well as requisite knowledge, but those studies generally focus on the processes through which new auditors are molded toward consistency with social norms. In contrast, we focus on forces affecting the transfer of technical knowledge from supervisor (guide) to subordinate (learner) in the everyday work setting. Our evidence derives from semi‐structured interviews with 30 relatively new and more experienced audit partners at one Big 4 firm, thus spanning multiple “generations” of experience. Results confirm that auditors primarily acquire technical knowledge on the job, through the interactions among individual engagement team members. However, partners express concern about changes in the practice environment that may limit effectiveness of on‐the‐job learning, including characteristics of personnel, the approach to formal training at induction, supervisors' reluctance to provide candid feedback, regulatory and economic pressures, and the increased distraction, and reduced interpersonal contact associated with the use of information technology. At the end of the day, our findings raise implications for practice regarding the difficulty of developing effective learning conditions for auditors in the face of these challenges.

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In this study, we examine how norms about the use of negotiation strategies by different parties in an auditor–client negotiation influence the relative efficacies of these negotiation strategies. We conduct an experiment with experienced auditors/financial managers as participants, who enter into a negotiation on an income‐decreasing audit adjustment with a hypothetical client/auditor who uses a strategy where the same concessions are given either at the start, gradually, or the end of the negotiation. We find that the concession‐end strategy is more effective than the concession‐start strategy when used by auditors; however, the reverse is true when these same strategies are used by financial managers. The concession‐gradual strategy leads to superior outcomes when used by either auditors or clients. We also provide evidence that auditors’ and financial managers’ perceptions of the norms relating to the use of these strategies correspond to what we propose in our theory.

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.

We introduce a measure of customer franchise value for subscription‐based companies—a fast growing and vital sector of the economy. This measure is based on information voluntarily disclosed by some, but not all, firms. Controlling for self‐selection, we examine the measure's information content and find that customer value is significantly positively associated with stock price and this association is incremental to both GAAP and a set of non‐ GAAP variables typically considered in valuation tests. Furthermore, we show that the customer value measure is positively associated with future earnings and analysts' forecast errors. Importantly, we find that the documented results are robust to controlling for the individual inputs used to derive the measure, highlighting the need to consider the interaction between stand‐alone value drivers in assessing a firm's performance. These findings indicate that the proposed measure of customer value is an important valuation tool that quantifies and summarizes the main trends and factors underlying the performance of subscription‐based enterprises. This study informs researchers and investors, as well as accounting policymakers, about a major value‐generating asset currently missing from corporate financial reports.

Corporate governance mechanisms designed to alleviate manager‐shareholder agency conflicts can worsen shareholder‐bondholder conflicts. This study examines how one such corporate governance mechanism, monitoring by large outside shareholders, influences the choice between public and private debt. I conjecture and find that firms with higher outside blockholdings are inclined to choose bank loans over public debt when they borrow, consistent with the notion that banks are better monitors than public debt markets. I also find that bank loans carry less price protection than corporate bonds against increased agency risk associated with outside blocks. Corroborating the monitoring story, I document that bank loans contain more accounting‐based covenants and dividend restriction provisions for firms with higher outside blockholdings than for those with lower blockholdings. I find no such relation for public debt covenants. This supports that banks' monitoring of their loans counters the agency risk caused by blockholders. This study extends prior research that associates governance mechanisms with agency costs of debt, by incorporating lenders' differential monitoring mechanisms in the overall corporate governance system.