Knowledge that Transforms

Theory suggests that financial report‐based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false‐positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income‐increasing and non–income‐increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible‐inclusive versus intangible‐exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.

Management earnings forecasts expressed as a range have become the most common form of quantitative management guidance. Traditionally, the proxy for the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by these forecasts—the forecast news—is calculated as the difference between a pre‐forecast earnings expectation and the midpoint of the forecasted range. We provide strong evidence that this traditional measure understates the amount of information conveyed by range forecasts. More importantly, we demonstrate that information conveyed by the upper and lower bounds of the forecasts can be used to improve the classification of forecasts as conveying good or bad news and for calculating the magnitude of that news. We rely on these findings to suggest alternative methods of classifying management range forecasts as conveying good versus bad news and to refine the calculation of forecast news to include the broader information set. Our analysis also suggests that the information conveyed by the range when the forecasts are bundled (issued concurrent with an earnings announcement) is significantly different than when forecasts are not bundled. Overall, our study documents the importance of incorporating range‐related information when assessing the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by management range forecasts.

There is a maintained assumption within the accounting literature that client bankruptcies preceded by clean audit opinions (Type II going concern opinion (GCO) errors) damage an auditor's reputation. Consistent with this view, the PCAOB proposes that stakeholders may use Type II GCO errors as indicators of low audit quality. This study examines audit committee and investor responses to Type II GCO errors. I find no evidence that audit offices with Type II GCOs are more likely to be dismissed, have lower subsequent audit fees, or have a lower likelihood of being selected for new audit engagements. These findings are consistent with audit committees not using Type II GCO errors as indicators of low auditor quality. Using event study analysis, I find evidence of modest incremental negative investor responses for clients of audit offices with Type II GCO errors. However, these negative investor responses are found only during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010 and are observed only within windows of 30 days or less. Given this limited evidence that stakeholders do respond to Type II GCO errors, I examine whether stakeholders should respond to Type II GCO errors. I find that audit office Type II GCO errors are positively associated with subsequent restatements, an established measure of low audit quality. Taking the results as a whole, I do not find that audit offices incur substantial reputational costs for Type II GCO errors. However, the negative investor response and the positive association with restatements provide some evidence that Type II GCO errors may serve as indicators of low audit quality.

This paper investigates the common, yet previously opaque, practice of using foreign audit firms (component auditors) to conduct portions of audit work for U.S. public companies. U.S. regulators have expressed concern for the transparency and quality of audits using component auditors. Employing data disclosed in the newly mandated PCAOB Form AP, we find that component auditor use is largely structural, determined by the size and complexity of clients' multinational operations. We do not find that the mere use of component auditors is detrimental to audit outcomes, but rather the amount of work conducted by component auditors is associated with lower audit quality (i.e., higher likelihood of misstatement), higher likelihood of nontimely reporting, and higher audit fees, which collectively suggest that component auditor engagements are associated with adverse outcomes. Furthermore, we find that only the work performed by less competent component auditors and those facing geographic and cultural/language barriers, including significant geographic and cultural distance, weak rule of law, and low English language proficiency, is associated with adverse audit outcomes. Overall, these findings provide initial archival evidence that the use of certain component auditors on U.S. multinational audits is associated with audit coordination issues, which suggests that PCAOB Form AP disclosures provide relevant information.

We investigate whether accounting conservatism, which has been found to be effective in constraining management opportunism in other settings, constrains upward tone management (UTM) in the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) portion of the 10‐K filing. We hypothesize that conservatism makes it harder for managers to opportunistically downplay bad news and magnify good news when discussing current performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that UTM is negatively associated with several accounting conservatism proxies. Additionally, we hypothesize and find that this association is stronger for firms where managers have higher incentives to manipulate tone. In supplemental analyses, we find evidence to suggest that our results are not due to an endogenous relationship between conservatism and UTM. We also find that conservatism neither encourages downward tone management (DTM) nor constrains managers from conveying real information about future good news. Together, our results suggest that accounting conservatism improves disclosure narratives.

Prior research documents that auditors fail to revise audit plans to effectively address identified fraud cues. While auditors may understand what evidence would address such cues, we propose that auditors fail to apply this understanding because they use implemental mindsets when making decisions for themselves (i.e., deciding). However, we also propose that auditors use deliberative mindsets when advising. To test our predictions, we assign auditors to a decider or an advisor role in a realistic case that contains seeded fraud cues and asks them to consider revising last year's plan. We also manipulate whether the case prompts auditors to revise the plan unconventionally . Results indicate decider‐condition auditors use implemental mindsets: Prompted deciders follow the unconventional plan without regard to underlying fraud risk and unprompted deciders stick with the same‐as‐last‐year plan. Advisor‐condition auditors use more deliberative mindsets: In the prompt and no prompt conditions, they identify plans that are strongly linked to their own fraud risk assessments and that better align with experts' recommended plan for effectively addressing the seeded fraud cues. Supplemental analyses suggest deciding and advising auditors both follow the experts' plan when they believe in its potential effectiveness but, after controlling for the influence of perceived effectiveness, deciding auditors follow it to a greater extent simply because they believe the PCAOB wants it. By contrast, advising auditors do not exhibit signs of excessive PCAOB influence. Our findings provide evidence that seeking informal advice (or thinking like an advisor) helps auditors to effectively revise audit plans in response to identified fraud risk—it helps when a prompt is present or not, suggesting it complements rather than merely substitutes for interventions meant to improve auditors' judgment and decision making.

To test hypotheses about earnings management, many studies investigate managers' manipulation of real activities (real earnings management, REM). Tests using measures of abnormal REM hinge critically on the measurement of normal real activities. Yet, there is no systematic evidence on the statistical properties of commonly used REM measures. We provide such evidence by documenting the Type I error rates and power of the test of the REM measures commonly used in the literature. We find these measures are often misspecified with Type I error rates that deviate from the nominal significance level of the test, especially in samples of firms with extreme performance or firm characteristics. We also compare the specification and power of traditional REM measures with performance‐matched REM measures to see if the latter provide better specified and more powerful tests. While performance‐matched REM measures are not immune from misspecification in all settings, in general they are better specified under the null hypothesis (i.e., in terms of Type I errors) than are traditional REM measures. Comparisons of the power to detect abnormal REM reveal that neither approach, traditional or performance‐matched, is consistently more powerful than the other in terms of detecting abnormal REM ranging from 1 to 10 percent of (lagged) total assets. The absence of a dominant approach to measure abnormal REM leads us to recommend that future researchers report results using both traditional and performance‐matched measures, so that readers are able to clearly assess the reliability of the inferences drawn about the magnitude and significance of the abnormal REM documented in a given study.

We examine the use of intuition versus analytical thinking in auditor risk assessment using a task that requires auditors to assess a group of impairment indicators. We expect that auditor intuition, rooted in the subconscious, more likely reacts to impairment indicator risk than does auditor analytical thinking. Results from two different experiments support this expectation for less‐experienced audit seniors. These seniors are more likely to assess step‐zero impairment indicators as signaling potential impairment when prompted to think intuitively versus analytically . In contrast, a third experiment finds that experienced seniors are more likely to assess step‐zero impairment indicators as signaling potential impairment when prompted to think analytically versus intuitively . This is consistent with the more experienced but still non‐expert seniors possessing developed analytical thinking, but struggling to effectively use their intuition. Our results inform theory by suggesting under what conditions auditor intuition and analytical thinking produce differential risk sensitivity. Furthermore, our results inform practice, given regulators' stated focus on auditor skepticism and impairment assessments.

We combine a fundamental property of accruals and a behavioral phenomenon to provide an explanation for the accrual anomaly. The fundamental property is accruals that originate must subsequently reverse. The behavioral phenomenon is individuals tend to underestimate the variance of noisy signals in various domains of decision making. We argue that originating accruals represents a noisier signal than reversing accruals because the uncertainty of whether originating accruals will eventually convert into cash is high, while there is no uncertainty regarding reversing accruals. If investors underestimate the variance of originating accruals but understand reversing accruals, then originating accruals will be mispriced while reversing accruals will not. To test this prediction, we first develop and empirically validate a novel method for ex ante detecting accrual originations and their reversals. Then we document that investors face increased uncertainty when accruals originate and decreased uncertainty when accruals reverse, and we provide evidence that only originating accruals are mispriced. We further demonstrate that our findings can be useful for improving the accrual‐based trading strategy by ex ante detecting and removing accrual reversals from extreme accrual portfolios. Overall, we provide a behavioral explanation for the accrual anomaly that is consistent with the mispricing of originating accruals only.

We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by (i) the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs. consistent with shareholders' interests) and (ii) the method of earnings management (accruals vs. real methods). Using a controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is impaired when the outcome of earnings management suggests that managers have put their interests above shareholders' interests and/or when the method of earnings management suggests that managers misreported the firm's economic performance. We argue that shareholders assess managers putting their interests above shareholders' interests as a signal of untrustworthiness because it involves a transfer of the firm's resources away from shareholders to managers. We argue that shareholders also assess managers' use of accruals to manage earnings as a signal of untrustworthiness because, in this instance, managers misreport the firm's economic performance. Finally, we show that trust mediates the combined effects of the outcome of earnings management and the method of earnings management on investment decisions. Our study incrementally contributes to the literature by highlighting the adverse implications of managers' use of accruals to manage earnings even when its outcome serves shareholders' interests.