We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time‐series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be “neglected” stocks with relatively high book‐to‐market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies.

We examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relationship to stock prices. Beginning six months before the offering, our sample issuing firms dramatically increase their disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. The increase is significant after controlling for the firm's current and future earnings performance and tends to be largest for firms with selling shareholders participating in the offering. However, there is no change in the frequency of forward‐looking statements prior to the equity offering, something that is expressly discouraged by the securities law. Firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering, and only minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. Firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity in the six months before the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting that the disclosure increase may have been used to “hype the stock” and the market may have partially corrected for the earlier price increase. Firms that maintain a consistent disclosure level have no unusual return behavior relative to the control firms subsequent to the announcement, while the firms that “hyped” their stock continue to suffer negative returns, providing further evidence that the increased disclosure activity may have been hype, and suggesting that the hype may have been successful in lowering the firms' cost of equity capital.

Examines the relations between the disclosure practices of firms, the number of analysts following each firm and properties of the analysts' earnings forecasts. Forecast dispersion and disclosure; Forecast accuracy and disclosure; Volatility of forecast revisions and disclosure.

Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell J. Lundholm, Wilfred C. Uecker, A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, Studies on Accounting Earnings and Security Valuation: Current Research Issues (1985), pp. 81-120

This paper examines the effect of the moral hazard problem in an agency relationship where the principal cannot observe the level of service provided by the agent. Using data from laboratory markets, we demonstrate that the presence of moral hazard leads to shirking by agents. However, this “lemons” phenomenon occurs only about one‐half of the time. While there is evidence of reputation effects in these markets, seemingly reputable agents are often able to use opportunities for false advertising to their advantage and “ripoff” principals.

We examine the readability of text and the use of numbers in the annual filings and earnings press releases of foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges. We find that foreign firms generally write clearer text and present relatively more numerical data than their U.S. firm counterparts. More importantly, we find that the readability of the text and use of numbers increases as the foreign firms get geographically further from the U.S. It also increases as the foreign firm's home country has greater differences in accounting standards or investor protection laws relative to the U.S. Further corroborating our results, we also find that these communication efforts are partially successful. Within a country, firms that produce relatively more readable disclosures attract relatively more U.S. institutional ownership. Collectively, our results suggest that foreign firms are responding to a perceived reluctance on the part of U.S. investors to own them and attempt to lower the investors' information disadvantage or psychological distance by providing clearer and more concrete disclosures.