An important issue in audit judgment research concerns auditors' use of unaudited book values when making judgments in the presampling phase of the audit. This paper presents a rudimentary model of the auditor's belief revision process with respect to unaudited book values from an audit value estimation perspective. An experiment testing some implications of the model is also presented. The model proposes that the auditor should judge the validity of unaudited book values in the circumstances and use them accordingly when making presampling audit value estimates. The experimental results indicated that the subjects (auditors) used available unaudited book values and that the extent of usage varied over accounts. However, the results also indicated some inaccurate presampling validity judgments which led to overweighting of unaudited book values. Résumé. Une question importante qui préoccupe les chercheurs dans le domaine de la formulation de jugements en vérification a trait à l'utilisation par les vérificateurs de valeurs comptables non vérifiées dans la formulation de jugements au cours de la phase de la vérification précédant l'échantillonnage. Les auteurs présentent un modèle rudimentaire du processus de révision des convictions du vérificateur en ce qui a trait aux valeurs comptables non vérifiées dans une perspective d'estimation de la valeur de vérification. Ils font également état d'une expérience destinée à vérifier certaines des conséquences du modèle. Selon le modèle, le vérificateur devrait juger de la validité des valeurs comptables non vérifiées dans les circonstances et les utiliser en conséquence dans la formation d'estimations de la valeur de vérification avant échantillonnage. Les résultats de l'expérience révèlent que les sujets (vérificateurs) utilisent les valeurs comptables non vérifiées disponibles et que l'étendue de cette utilisation varie avec les comptes. Toutefois, les résultats révèlent aussi l'inexactitude de certains jugements relatifs à la validité antérieure à l'échantillonnage, à la suite desquels une importance trop grande a été accordée aux valeurs comptables non vérifiées.

This paper provides empirical evidence on a truth-inducing pay scheme widely discussed and analyzed in the Incentive contracting literature. An experiment was conducted in which subjects acted as subordinates who performed e production task. Budgets were participatively set under either a truth-inducing or slack-inducing pay scheme and either the presence or absence of a superior-subordinate Information asymmetry about subordinate performance capability. Slack was defined as expected performance minus the participatively set budget. The results showed that, when the information asymmetry was absent, slack did not differ significantly between the pay schemes. However, when the Information asymmetry was present, slack was significantly lower under the truth-inducing scheme. Similarly, the pay scheme and information asymmetry variables Interacted to affect performance.

We explore the determinants of equity price risk of nonfinancial corporations. Operating and asset characteristics are by far the most important determinants of risk. For the median firm, financial risk accounts for only 15% of observed stock price volatility. Furthermore, financial risk has declined over the last 3 decades, indicating that any upward trend in equity volatility was driven entirely by economic risk factors. This explains why financial distress (as opposed to economic distress) was surprisingly uncommon in the nonfinancial sector during the 2007–2009 crisis even as measures of equity volatility reached unprecedented highs.

Since 2012, all European Union countries have required disclosure of large short positions. This reduces short interest, bid-ask spreads, and the informativeness of prices. After specific disclosures, short-run abnormal returns are insignificantly negative, but 90-day cumulative abnormal returns are a statistically significant -5.23%. We find disclosures are likely to be followed by other disclosures, especially when the initial discloser is large or centrally located. However, there is no subsequent increase in short interest, and prices do not subsequently reverse. These results indicate that large short sellers are well informed, and that disclosures are not being used to coordinate manipulative attacks.