Knowledge that Transforms

Previous articleNext article FreeOfficers of the SocietyPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMore2017–2018 Board of OfficersPresident: Marjorie McElroy, Duke UniversityPresident-Elect: Joseph Altonji, Yale UniversityVice President: Katharine G. Abraham, University of MarylandExecutive Board (2016–2018):Jennifer Hunt, Rutgers UniversityChinhui Juhn, University of HoustonExecutive Board (2017–19): Jeffrey Smith, University of MichiganNicole Fortin, University of British ColumbiaDan Black, University of Chicago and NORC, ex officioPaul Oyer, Stanford University and the Journal of Labor Economics, ex officioSecretary-Treasurer: Maggie NewmanFellows of the Society of Labor EconomistsJohn AbowdKatharine AbrahamDaron AcemogluGeorge AkerlofJoseph AltonjiJoshua AngristOrley AshenfelterDavid AutorGary Becker*Marianne BertrandSandra BlackRebecca BlankFrancine BlauRichard BlundellGeorge BorjasJohn BoundCharles BrownKenneth BurdettGlen Cain*David CardPierre-Andre ChiapporiJanet CurrieSteven J. DavisJohn DiNardoRon EhrenbergHenry FarberRichard FreemanRoland G. FryerVictor FuchsRobert GibbonsClaudia GoldinReuben GronauRobert HallJohn HaltiwangerDan HamermeshEric HanushekJames HeckmanCaroline M. HoxbyGeorge Johnson*Lawrence KahnLawrence KatzJohn KennanAlan KruegerKevin LangRichard LayardEdward LazearThomas LemieuxShelly LundbergStephen MachinW. Bentley MacLeodThomas MaCurdyAlan ManningMarjorie McElroyCostas MeghirRobert MichaelJacob Mincer*Robert MoffittEnrico MorettiDale Mortensen*Richard MurnaneKevin MurphyDerek NealSteve NickellWalter Oi*John PencavelChristopher PissaridesRobert PollakCanice PrendergastMelvin Reder*Mark RosenzweigKathryn ShawRob ShimerJames SmithJeffrey SmithGary SolonFrank StaffordChris TaberPetra ToddRobert TopelJohn Van ReenenYoram WeissFinis WelchRobert WillisNew Fellows Elected in 2017Kerwin Kofi CharlesChristian DustmannRobert LaLonde Notes *. Deceased. Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Labor Economics Volume 35, Number 3July 2017 Published for the Society of Labor Economists, Economics Research Center/ NORC Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/692686 © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

We study the effect of salience in the social security benefit system on labor earnings by exploiting kinks and notches in budget lines introduced by earnings testing and social security accrual mechanisms for 67- to 69-year-old workers in Norway. An earnings test had large effects on labor earnings, while an accrual system discontinuity had no discernible effects. We interpret the difference as likely to be caused by a lack of salience in the accrual incentives: agents are not able or willing to take into account the value of future benefit increases when considering the relevant rewards for working.

Much nonmanagerial work is routine, with all workers having similar output most of the time. However, failure to address occasional challenges can be very costly, and consequently easily detected, while challenges handled well pass unnoticed. We analyze job assignment and worker monitoring for such “guardian” jobs. If monitoring costs are positive but small, monitoring is nonmonotonic in the firm’s belief about the probability that a worker is good. The model explains several empirical regularities regarding nonmanagerial internal labor markets: low use of performance pay, seniority pay, rare demotions, wage ceilings within grade, and wage jumps at promotion.

The key finding of this paper is that women Workforce Investment Act (WIA) trainees select higher-return fields than men but men usually have higher returns than women in the same field. Among men, the higher the level of education, the greater the proportion who select high-return fields; the reverse is true for women. Finally, most men select fields that are predominantly male, and vice versa for women, even though gains among men and women making unconventional choices are often large. Thus, there is considerable room for men and women to increase their gains by altering their choice of field.

Private equity firms are often criticized for laying off workers, but the evidence on who loses their jobs and why is scarce. This paper argues that explanations for job polarization also explain layoffs after private equity buyouts. Buyouts reduce agency problems, which triggers automation and offshoring. Using rich employer-employee data, we show that buyouts generally do not affect unemployment incidence. However, unemployment incidence doubles for workers in less productive firms who perform routine or offshorable job tasks. Job polarization is also much more marked among workers affected by buyouts than for the economy at large.