Given the complex and controversial nature of short-selling regulation, we review the academic literature and provide insights for policy makers and academics. We organize the complex history of short-selling regulation into three areas: trading restrictions, securities lending regulations, and disclosure requirements. We identify, analyze, and discuss 45 distinct regulations promulgated from 1896 to 2021, primarily by reviewing the academic literature and the data sources employed. We provide several insights regarding the effectiveness of regulatory approaches and the wider impact of short-selling regulation on markets. (JEL G2, G12, G14, G15, G34)

The U.S. banking sector had nearly 70% fewer banks in 2022 relative to 1989, primarily because of mergers. We develop a methodology to estimate cross-market spillover effects of bank mergers and test whether the operations of incumbents facing consolidating competitors in one market are affected in other markets. We find that nonmerging banks within a market that are one standard deviation more exposed to mergers in other markets increase deposits by 2.1% relative to their less exposed competitors. Our methodology may be applied elsewhere to assess the aggregate impacts of industry consolidation and illustrates challenges with product-based or geographic market definitions.

Eric A. Posner of University of Chicago reviews “The Problem of Twelve: When a Few Financial Institutions Control Everything” by John Coates. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores issues that arise when a small number of actors acquire the means to exert outsized influence over the politics and economy of a nation, focusing in particular on the two late-twentieth-century institutions of index funds and private equity funds.”

We examine the determinants of investor flows into, and the potential market fragility imposed by, U.S. municipal bond mutual funds. We find that funds have a linear flow-performance relationship that is consistent with effective liquidity management strategies. Funds use liquid holdings to partially offset net redemptions, but trade municipal bonds in proportion to flows. Funds increase their liquid holdings after flow volatility increases. The fact that funds use a vertical slice approach as a primary strategy is not surprising because they maintain small amounts of liquid securities. Our evidence is consistent with investors not being concerned with municipal bond mutual funds promoting run-risk.

Financial intermediation has distinct value from transforming financial claims to create liquidity and mitigate risks. However, research and policy competition analyses often neglect this value or minimally account for it. We review findings to better incorporate this value. We suggest shifting the mix of individual services analyzed to better represent the distinct value, focusing more on topics closely aligned with the distinct value concept beyond individual services, and accounting for the multimarket nature of financial intermediation. We recommend attention on future competition with digital FinTech, BigTech, and DeFi firms and policies to best preserve the distinct value of financial intermediation.

We make use of rich U.S. data to show that debt overhang significantly reduces firm asset-, capex-, and employee-growth. We show these contractions are likely driven by firm decisions as opposed to the result of credit constraints or changes in investment opportunities. Our measure of overhang – liabilities to cash flow — aligns with traditional theory and focuses on the importance of a firm’s debt servicing capacity. It further allows us to capitalize on the COVID-19 shock as a quasi-natural experiment to confirm the impact of overhang on firm investment and growth.

The sudden and exogenous nature of the COVID-19 crash provides a unique identification opportunity to study insiders’ informational advantages. We find that the sales of insiders at firms with connections to China were significantly more profitable during the COVID-19 crisis than the sales of insiders at firms without connections to China. Consistent with greater attentiveness to public information about the COVID-19 pandemic, this result is driven by China connected insiders executing larger (smaller) sales in the early (late) COVID-19 period than non–China connected insiders. We find our results are driven by trades that are not preplanned under Rule 10b5–1 and are consistent with anticipation of the systematic market effects of COVID-19 on an insider’s firm as opposed to firm-specific effects. Aggregate China connected insider trades also predict market returns during the COVID-19 period. Our study contributes to the insider trading literature by introducing geographic connection to market-wide information as a source of public information advantage and to regulatory efforts to investigate and understand corporate insider behavior related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

We find evidence consistent with risk mispricing in the eurozone sovereign credit market for crisis and non-crisis countries alike, using a novel variable of sovereign debt expansion (DE) that we construct. DE predicts increased default probability, but panel regressions from 2002 to 2017 show a negative association with risk premia, even when controlling for risk appetite and the known determinants of sovereign risk premia. As expected, the negative association was only briefly interrupted by the 2010 Deauville Summit, but it resumed by the onset of the 2011 eurozone crisis. The introduction of quantitative easing in 2015 mutes the negative association, raising the concern of what will happen once quantitative easing ends. Our finding is robust to several model specifications.

Theories of loan contracting in the presence of asymmetric information highlight the key role of collateral in mitigating against credit rationing. However, theory also allows for the use of collateral by ‘bad’ borrowers in order to receive better loan contract offers. In this study, we explore the extent to which collateral can affect the incidence of absolute loan denial and partial rationing associated with smaller loans than requested being offered. Using data from a large survey of UK small- and-medium enterprises, we find significant evidence on the negative effect of collateral. Our results also reveal important distinction between lines of credit and term loans, where the presence of collateral is associated with 3 % less term loan approved compared to overdraft. We argue that even the request (or offer) of collateral for a term loan indicates that either the bank or the firm believes it is a risky bet.