In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm.

Recent empirical studies have indicated that spin-offs are value enhancing, yet the theoretical aspects of spin-off gains have not been as well explored. This paper presents a theoretical analysis of spin-offs. In the model of the firm presented, outstanding risky debt gives rise to agency costs of underinvestment, which are offset by the benefit of debt-related tax shields. The trade-off specifies the optimal leverage for a firm. Within this framework, the paper considers whether and under what circumstances firm value could be enhanced by a spin-off. It is shown that a spin-off in which parent company debt is optimally allocated between the post-spin-off firms increases value by reducing agency costs and increasing the value of tax shields when the component firm cash flows are positively correlated. The optimal allocation is characterized in terms of the parameters of the technologies of the component firms. When the component cash flows are negatively correlated, under the sufficient conditions developed, a combined firm operation dominates spin-offs. Here, the coinsurance effect on investment incentives dominates the effect of a flexible allocation of debt across technologies in a spin-off.

This paper explores the effects of mergers on the investment incentives of the levered firm and on levered firm value. Under a fairly broad set of assumptions, it is shown that most firm combinations “improve” investment incentives, bringing about a reduction in the agency costs of underinvestment associated with risky debt. The effect of the merger on debt and equity claim values is also explored. If not properly anticipated, the merger may create a wealth transfer from equity holders to bondholders. Such a wealth transfer includes, but is not limited to, the “coinsurance effect.”

Journal Article Uncertainty and the ”Expectations Hypothesis“ Get access H. A. John Green H. A. John Green University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 34, Issue 4, October 1967, Pages 387–398, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296557 Published: 01 October 1967

Journal Article The Social Optimum in the presence of Monopoly and Taxation Get access H. A. John Green H. A. John Green Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 29, Issue 1, October 1961, Pages 66–78, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296184 Published: 01 October 1961

Thomas A. Buchman, John A. Tracy, Obtaining Responses to Sensitive Questions: Conventional Questionnaire versus Randomized Response Technique, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring, 1982), pp. 263-271

This paper examines the effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) on shareholder wealth. ESOPs established in the presence of takeover activity reduce share values, by approximately 4% on average. ESOPs also reduce share values if they are structured to transfer control away from outside shareholders, by creating a new ownership block with veto power over takeover bids. Large ESOPs established with nonvoting stock, so as to preclude any immediate control transfers, result in a significant increase in share values. The wealth effect of any given ESOP thus depends upon both its incentive and control effects on the corporation.

James A. Miles, John R. Ezzell, The Weighted Average Cost of Capital, Perfect Capital Markets, and Project Life: A Clarification, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Sep., 1980), pp. 719-730

This paper provides a model in which audited reports are valuable to entrepreneurs who have private information and seek to share risks with investors. A distinctive feature of the model is that the choice of auditor and the resulting audited report provide partial information about the entrepreneur's private information, and he resolves all remaining investor uncertainty by signalling with retained ownership. The value of an audit is increasing in audit quality and the firm-specific risk faced by the entrepreneur and is a nondecreasing function of the entrepreneur's expectations about the future value of the firm.