We study a dynamic setting in which stochastic information (news) about the value of a privately informed seller's asset is gradually revealed to a market of buyers. We construct an equilibrium that involves periods of no trade or market failure. The no-trade period ends in one of two ways: either enough good news arrives, restoring confidence and markets reopen, or bad news arrives, making buyers more pessimistic and forcing capitulation that is, a partial sell-off of low-value assets. Conditions under which the equilibrium is unique are provided. We analyze welfare and efficiency as they depend on the quality of the news. Higher quality news can lead to more inefficient outcomes. Our model encompasses settings with or without a standard static adverse selection problem—in a dynamic setting with sufficiently informative news, reservation values arise endogenously from the option to sell in the future and the two environments have the same equilibrium structure.

We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller’s type from “news.” We show that the buyer’s ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. In fact, the buyer gains nothing from the ability to negotiate a better price despite the fact that a negotiation must take place in equilibrium. During the negotiation, the buyer engages in a form of costly “experimentation” by making offers that are sure to earn her negative payoffs if accepted, but speed up learning and improve her continuation payoff if rejected. We investigate the effects of market power by comparing our results to a setting with competitive buyers. Both efficiency and the seller’s payoff can decrease by introducing competition among buyers.

We propose an information‐based theory to explain time variation in liquidity and link it to a variety of patterns in asset markets. In “normal times,” the market is fully liquid and gains from trade are realized immediately. However, the equilibrium also involves periods during which liquidity “dries up,” which leads to endogenous liquidation costs. Traders correctly anticipate such costs, which reduces their willingness to pay. This foresight leads to a novel feedback effect between prices and market liquidity, which are jointly determined in equilibrium. The model also predicts that contagious sell‐offs can occur after sufficiently bad news.

We propose a model of due diligence and analyze its effect on prices, payoffs, and deal completion. In our model, if the seller accepts an offer, the winning bidder (or “acquirer”) can gather information and chooses when to complete the transaction. In equilibrium, the acquirer engages in “too much” due diligence. Our quantitative results suggest that the magnitude of the distortion is economically significant. Nevertheless, allowing for due diligence can improve both total surplus and the seller's payoff compared to a setting without due diligence. We use our framework to explore the timing of due diligence, bidder heterogeneity, and breakup fees.

We investigate the effect of scrutiny (e.g., credit ratings, analyst reports, or mandatory disclosures) on the security design problem of a privately informed issuer. We show that scrutiny has important implications for both the form of security designed and the amount of inefficient retention of cash flows. The model predicts that issuers will design informationally sensitive securities (i.e., levered equity) when scrutiny is sufficiently intense. Otherwise, issuers opt for a standard debt contract. Scrutiny increases efficiency by decreasing issuers’ reliance on retention to signal quality and, perhaps counterintuitively, decrease price informativeness.

We develop a framework to explore the effect of credit ratings on loan origination. We show that ratings endogenously shift the economy from a signaling equilibrium, in which banks inefficiently retain loans to signal quality, toward an originate‐to‐distribute equilibrium with zero retention and inefficiently low lending standards. Ratings increase overall efficiency, provided that the reduction in costly retention more than compensates for the origination of some negative net present value loans. We study how banks' ability to screen loans affects these predictions and use the model to analyze commonly proposed policies such as mandatory “skin in the game.”

We demonstrate that eponymy—firms being named after their owners—is linked to superior firm performance, but is relatively uncommon (about 19 percent of firms in our data). We propose an explanation based on eponymy creating an association between the entrepreneur and her firm that increases the reputational benefits/costs of successful/unsuccessful outcomes. We develop a corresponding signaling model, which further predicts that these effects will be stronger for entrepreneurs with rarer names. We find support for the model's predictions using a unique panel dataset consisting of over 1.8 million firms.