We ask what determines the profitability of candlestick trading strategies. Is it the definition of trend and/or the holding strategy that one uses in candlestick charting analysis? To answer this, we systematically consider three definitions of trend and four holding strategies. Applying candlestick trading strategies to the DJIA component data, we find that regardless of which definition of trend is used, eight three-day reversal patterns with a Caginalp–Laurent holding strategy are profitable when we set the transaction cost at 0.5% and after we account for data-snooping bias, while the patterns with a Marshall–Young–Rose holding strategy are not profitable. For sensitivity analysis, we also find that our results are not qualitatively changed on a lower transaction cost of 0.1%, or when we conduct the subsample analyses based on three equal periods and three distinct market conditions. When considering a more volatile market, evidence in favor of candlestick trading strategies is strengthened.

To deter financial misstatements, many companies have recently adopted compensation recovery policies—commonly known as ‘‘clawbacks’’—that authorize the board to recoup compensation paid to executives based on misstated financial reports. Clawbacks have been shown to reduce financial misstatements and increase investors’ confidence on earnings information. We show that the benefits come with an unintended consequence of certain firms substituting for accruals management with real transactions management (e.g., reduce research and development [R&D] expenditures), especially firms with strong incentives to achieve short-term earnings targets, such as firms with high growth or high transient institutional ownership. As such, the total amount of earnings management does not decrease subsequent to clawback adoption. We further show that although real transactions management temporarily boosts those clawback adopters’ short-term profitability and stock performance, this trend reverses after three years. In summary, clawbacks may have unexpected effects for a subset of firms whose managers are under greater pressure to meet earnings goals.