Abstract In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.

In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review-level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit-level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one-year-ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review-level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit-level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non-Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.

ABSTRACT We examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition: securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions. The implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets. We find such a decline over the first several periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings. There is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement.

The authors examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition: securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions. The implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets. The authors find such a decline over the first several periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings. There is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement.

We examine empirical implications of models of differential information that formalize the following intuition: securities for which there is relatively little information are perceived as relatively more risky because of the greater uncertainty surrounding the exact parameters of their return distributions. The implication that beta risk for low information firms should decline as information increases is confirmed with several data sets. We find such a decline over the first several periods subsequent to initial public offerings and initial listings. There is also an abrupt risk decline at the first annual earnings announcement.

This paper tests the demand-side prediction of Datar, Feltham, and Hughes (1991) that new issuers of securities are more likely to choose a high-quality auditor and retain a lower level of ownership as the firm-specific riskiness of future cash flows increases. Previous tests of this hypothesis using U.S. data have generally been inconclusive, perhaps because an increase in the riskiness of client cash flows simultaneously increases an auditor's litigation risk and supply price. Our results using data from a significantly different legal environment (Canada) are consistent with the predictions of Datar, Feltham, and Hughes.

THE PROBLEM of selecting a portfolio can be divided into two components: (1) the analysis of individual securities and (2) the selection of a portfolio or group of securities based on the previous analysis. Up to now, the majority of writers have focused on the first part of the problem and have developed several, well-accepted methods of analysis.1 Little attention has been paid to the second phase of the problem. It is to this second part of the portfolio selection process that this paper is principally devoted.