We study changes in market quality associated with 9 modifications to the New York State securities transaction tax (STT) between 1932 and 1981 and 3 changes to the federal STT between 1932 and 1966. We find that when there is an increase in the level of an STT, individual stock volatility increases, bid–ask spreads widen, price impacts are greater, and volume decreases. We examine the propensity of traders to switch trading locations to avoid the tax and find mixed evidence that they will change locations. Overall, our findings support the notion that the imposition of or increases in an STT harm market quality.

This article examines late trade reporting on the Nasdaq National Market System. A substantial number of trades are reported out-of-sequence on both absolute levels and relative to the combined centralized exchanges. We find minimal support for NASD permitted reasons for the late trade reporting. Evidence suggests that market makers could use late trade reporting to manage the release of information. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the delayed reporting of trades is neither a random occurrence nor fully explainable by factors outside the market maker's control.

Many financial markets, including electronic limit order markets, assign designated liquidity providers (LPs). We study the experience of the Stockholm Stock Exchange, where listed firms contract directly with LPs. Our analysis offers insights regarding situations where designated liquidity provision may be beneficial. In addition, we consider the form of liquidity provision contracts, including affirmative obligations required of the LP and compensation for LP services. We find that low current trading activity, wide spreads, and higher information asymmetry increase the attractiveness of contracted liquidity provision. The evidence indicates that LPs trade against market movements and in times of wide spreads. On balance, firms contracting with LPs experience a decreased cost of capital and significant improvements in market quality and price discovery.

The New York Stock Exchange repealed its Rule 390 on May 8, 2000. The rule disallowed exchange members from trading stocks listed prior to April 26, 1979 outside of an exchange. We examine the implications of the rule’s repeal on the competition for order flow as well as on measures of market quality such as spreads, depth and price improvement for stocks impacted by the rule. We use a second sample of stocks not subject to Rule 390 (Rule 19c-3 stocks) to control for market wide trends. We have three important findings: (1) Quoted spreads decrease by about 18% for Rule 390 stocks, three times more than the reduction for Rule 19c-3 stocks; (2) Effective spreads do not change; and (3) The NYSE lost little market share, even in smaller trades that were supposed to migrate, following the repeal. Our results indicate a paradigm shift in the way the NYSE specialists make a market. Prior to the repeal, the specialists set wider quotes but provided extensive price improvement. Following the repeal, the specialists set tighter quotes with lesser price improvement possibilities. We believe that this shift is a strategic response by the specialists to retain market share, not by improving market quality but by making order flow internalization and payment for order flow less profitable. As a result, competition improves market quality – but not in the way we would generally expect.

We examine the impact of differing levels of pretrade transparency on the quotation behavior of Nasdaq market makers. We find that market makers are more likely to quote on odd ticks, and to actively narrow the spread, when they can do so anonymously by posting limit orders on Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs). From a public policy perspective, our findings suggest that making the level of pretrade transparency on Nasdaq more opaque by allowing anonymous quotes could improve price competition and narrow spreads further.

This study shows that international firms listing their shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the London Stock Exchange (LSE) experience a significant increase in visibility, as proxied by analyst coverage and print media attention (The Wall Street Journal or Financial Times). The increase in analyst following is also associated with a decrease in the cost of equity capital after the listing event in a way consistent with Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis. Our results are stronger for NYSE listing firms than for LSE listing firms. This may partially compensate firms for the higher costs associated with NYSE listing (compared to LSE listing).