Using geographic variation in bank lending, I study how bank real estate losses affected the supply of credit and employment during the Great Recession. Banks exposed to distressed housing markets cut mortgage and small business lending relative to other banks in the same county. This lending contraction had real effects, as counties whose banks were exposed to adverse shocks in other markets suffered employment declines, especially in young firms and bank dependent industries. This credit contraction also caused wages to fall and consumer delinquencies to rise, contributing to subsequent declines in nontradable employment.

We investigate how capital requirements affect loan rates by studying the 50% increase in the risk weight for high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) loans under Basel III. Exploiting variation in loan terms and exposure to the period after the rule’s implementation, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in capital requirements raises loan rates by 8.5 basis points. Using a model of bank funding costs, we demonstrate the timing and scope of the HVCRE rule implies our estimate reflects the steady-state cost of capital requirements. (JEL G21, G28, G38)

Loan modifications can ease borrowers’ financial burdens and mitigate loan losses. However, the threat of future strategic renegotiation may cause lenders to tighten ex-ante credit provision. We evaluate this trade-off in a dynamic model of loan underwriting with frictional renegotiation and calibrate it using loan-level CRE data from banks and CMBS. We find that modification frictions can rationalize a number of empirical facts regarding how CRE loan underwriting and performance differ across lenders. Key to this result, high frictions to modifying CMBS loans reduce renegotiation, increase debt capacity, and cause high-leverage-demand borrowers to select into the CMBS market. Consequently, easing CMBS modification frictions reduces welfare by restricting the menu of LTVs available in the market.