We produce the first study to explore the effect of political money contributions on IPOs. Exploiting a hand-collected database, we show that both lobbying and PAC expenditure pay off on issue day as donors incur less underpricing, an effect that can be amplified by contribution size and strategic targeting of recipients. Investigating the causes in multiple channels, we also associate donor IPOs with negative offer price revisions and lower aftermarket volatility. Collectively, our results offer new empirical grounding to the information asymmetry theory.

This study quantifies the effects of persistently low interest rates near to the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary policy on pension fund risk incentives in the United States. Using two structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models and a counterfactual scenario analysis, the results show that monetary policy shocks, as identified by changes in Treasury yields following changes in the central bank's target interest rates, lead to a substantial increase in pension funds’ allocation to equity assets. Notably, the shift from bonds to equity securities is greater during the period where the US Federal Reserve launched unconventional monetary policy measures. Additional findings show a positive correlation between pension fund risk-taking, low interest rates and the decline in Treasury yields across both well-funded and underfunded public pension plans, which is thus consistent with a structural risk-shifting incentive.