This paper examines the retail gasoline price fluctuations known as gas wars. Weekly prices for the Los Angeles area were examined for the period from January 2, 1968 through December 23, 1975. The observed fluctuations were remarkably regular and, apparently, large ly predictable. The data appear consistent with the recent game theory model of E. Maskin and J. Tirole in which competing firms produce Edgeworth cycles by undercutting each other and eventually relenting.

While many studies find that option prices lead stock prices, J. A. Stephan and R. E. Whaley (1990) find that stocks lead options. The authors find no evidence that options, even deep out-of-the-money options, lead stocks. After confirming Stephan and Whaley's results, they show their results can be explained as spurious leads induced by infrequent trading of options. The authors show that the stock lead disappears when the average of the bid and ask prices is used instead of transaction prices. Hence, they find no evidence of arbitrage opportunities associated with the stock lead.

While many studies find that option prices lead stock prices, Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that stocks lead options. We find no evidence that options, even deep out‐of‐the‐money options, lead stocks. After confirming Stephan and Whaley's results, we show their results can be explained as spurious leads induced by infrequent trading of options. We show that the stock lead disappears when the average of the bid and ask prices is used instead of transaction prices. Hence, we find no evidence of arbitrage opportunities associated with the stock lead.