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Are all regulatory compliant independent director appointments the same? An analysis of Taiwanese board appointments

Journal of Corporate Finance 2018 50, 371-387 open access
Globally many regulators adopted a rules-based approach to independent director appointments stipulating ‘independence’ criteria. This paper investigates whether partitioning a regulatory compliant sample of independent director appointments by prior affiliation to the board influences the relationship between ownership and control rights, and performance. We report a significant positive relationship between board independence and controlling shareholders' cash-flow rights for firms where the appointee had prior affiliation to the board, but no performance improvement. Firms where the regulatory compliant independent directors had no prior-affiliation to the board experienced significant improvement in firms' next period Return-on-Assets. Appointing affiliated directors is indicative diminished board quality, which is consistent with the empirical evidence that controlling shareholders determine board quality to accommodate tunneling to extract the private benefits of control to compensate for significant additional costs associated with concentrated ownership (Yeh and Woidtke, 2005; Luo et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015). The positive association between performance and unaffiliated independent directors suggests a desire to introduce expertise to receive benefits via improved firm performance which is consistent with the literature, mostly from studies of emerging markets, reporting a causal link from independent directors to firm performance (Choi et al., 2007; Dahya et al. 2008; Liu et al., 2015).

Attendance of board meetings and company performance: Evidence from Taiwan

Journal of Banking & Finance 2013 37(11), 4157-4171 open access
This paper empirically investigates board meeting attendance and its effects on the performance of Taiwanese listed corporations. Directors with higher qualifications attend board meetings more often by themselves. The ownership of the largest shareholder of a company also has a positive effect on director’s own meeting attendance. High meeting attendance by directors themselves can enhance a firm’s performance but high attendance by their representatives has an adverse effect. Independence of directors or a board is also positively associated with firm performance. These results largely hold even when the sample is decomposed to count for different ownership structures and director types.

Overconfident Institutions and Their Self-Attribution Bias: Evidence from Earnings Announcements

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2021 56(5), 1738-1770 open access
Institutional demand for a stock before its earnings announcement is negatively related to subsequent returns. The relation is not attributable to the price pressure of institutional demand and is stronger for stocks with higher information asymmetry and/or greater valuation difficulty. These findings support the notion that overconfident institutions misprice stocks. Following announcements, institutions’ behavior exhibits the outcome-dependent feature of self-attribution bias. Whether they become more overconfident and delay their mispricing correction depends on whether earnings news confirms their preannouncement trades. This behavioral bias also offers a new explanation for the well-known post-earnings-announcement drift.