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The Home Economics of E-Money: Velocity, Cash Management, and Discount Rates of M-Pesa Users

American Economic Review 2013 103(3), 369-374
We study the mobile phone-based money transfer system in Kenya. Based on aggregate data, we estimate that the velocity with which units of e-money are transferred among users is approximately four times per month, and that the average number of transfers undergone by a unit of e-money between its creation and destruction is approximately one. Most M-Pesa transactions are made by frequent users. Examination of data on withdrawals shows a high frequency of small withdrawals and no response to “notches” in the price schedule, indicating that many users seem to have high implicit discount rates.

The Determinants and Consequences of School Choice Errors in Kenya

American Economic Review 2012 102(3), 283-288
School choice systems designed to help disadvantaged groups might be hindered by information asymmetries. Kenyan elite secondary schools admit students from the entire country based on a national test score, district quotas, and stated school choices. We find even the highest ability students make school choice errors. Girls, students with lower test scores, and students from public and low quality schools are more likely to make such errors. Net of observable demographic characteristics, these errors are associated with a decrease in the probability that a student is admitted to an elite secondary school, relegating them to schools of lower quality.

Inputs, Incentives, and Complementarities in Education: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania*

Quarterly Journal of Economics 2019 134(3), 1627-1673 open access
Abstract We present results from a large-scale randomized experiment across 350 schools in Tanzania that studied the impact of providing schools with (i) unconditional grants, (ii) teacher incentives based on student performance, and (iii) both of the above. After two years, we find (i) no impact on student test scores from providing school grants, (ii) some evidence of positive effects from teacher incentives, and (iii) significant positive effects from providing both programs. Most important, we find strong evidence of complementarities between the programs, with the effect of joint provision being significantly greater than the sum of the individual effects. Our results suggest that combining spending on school inputs (the default policy) with improved teacher incentives could substantially increase the cost-effectiveness of public spending on education.