Abstract How cyclical is the U.S. labor force participation rate (LFPR)? We examine exogenous state-level business cycle shocks, finding that the LFPR is highly cyclical, but with significantly longer-lived responses than the unemployment rate. After a negative shock, the LFPR declines for about four years—substantially lagging unemployment—and only fully recovers after about eight years. Our main specifications use age-sex-adjusted LFPR, and we show that using unadjusted LFPR is problematic because local shocks spur changes in the population of high-LFPR age groups. Cyclicality varies across groups, with larger and longer-lived responses among men, younger workers, less-educated workers, and Black workers.

By how much does an extension of unemployment benefits affect macroeconomic outcomes such as unemployment? Answering this question is challenging because U.S. law extends benefits for states experiencing high unemployment. We use data revisions to decompose the variation in the duration of benefits into the part coming from actual differences in economic conditions and the part coming from measurement error in the real-time data used to determine benefit extensions. Using only the variation coming from measurement error, we find that benefit extensions have a limited influence on state-level macroeconomic outcomes. We apply our estimates to the increase in the duration of benefits during the Great Recession and find that they increased the unemployment rate by at most 0.3 percentage point.

We analyze a monetary quasi–experiment in Sweden from 2010–2011, when the Riksbank raised the interest rate substantially. We argue that this increase was beyond what labor market conditions warranted, driven instead by new concerns about financial stability. Using a battery of specifications that rule out domestic or international confounders, we show that this monetary tightening led to a substantial economic contraction, raising unemployment by 1–2 percentage points. Using administrative microdata, we find that sectors with nominal wage rigidity drove much of the response and that the monetary contraction was more regressive than the typical business cycle. (JEL E24, E32, E43, E52, E58)