We study the effects on M&A outcomes of CEO network centrality, which measures the extent and strength of a CEO׳s personal connections. High network centrality can allow CEOs to efficiently gather and control private information, facilitating value-creating acquisition decisions. We show, however, that M&A deals initiated by high-centrality CEOs, in addition to being more frequent, carry greater value losses to both the acquirer and the combined entity than deals initiated by low-centrality CEOs. We also document that high-centrality CEOs are capable of avoiding the discipline of the markets for corporate control and the executive labor market, and that the mitigating effect of internal governance on CEO actions is limited. Our evidence suggests that corporate decisions can be influenced by a CEO׳s position in the social hierarchy, with high-centrality CEOs using their power and influence to increase entrenchment and reap private benefits.

The cost and terms of private debt are affected by the social capital of the borrowing firm's chief financial officer (CFO), proxied by measures of social network centrality that identify the relative position of CFO in the hierarchy of executives. Firms with CFOs possessing higher social capital issue new loans with lower spreads and fewer covenant restrictions, controlling for all direct connections between borrowers and lenders. Spread reductions are stronger for opaque firms and when CFOs lack objective reputation verification. The results hold when controlling for CFO personal characteristics and firm attributes related to network centrality.

Compared with mortgage brokers and universal banks, community banks have stronger incentives to originate high-quality residential home loans. Using the RealtyTrac database on residential foreclosures between 2005 and 2008, we show that county-level foreclosure rates are lower in counties with greater community bank presence. This finding is robust to a host of county-level economic and demographic control variables and after controlling for possible endogeneity of community bank presence.