[We examine the effects of price disclosure on market performance in a continuous experimental multiple-dealer market in which seven professional market makers trade a single security. The dealers trade with one another and with computerized informed and liquidity traders. Our key comparison is between fully public price queues (pretrade transparent market) and bilateral quoting (pretrade opaque). We find that opening spreads are wider and trading volume is lower in the opaque markets due to higher search costs there. More importantly, however, higher search costs also induce more aggressive pricing strategies, so that price discovery is much faster in the opaque markets.]

In this paper we present the results of an international survey among 313 cfos on capital structure choice. We document several interesting insights on how theoretical concepts are being applied by professionals in the uk, the netherlands, germany, and france and we directly compare our results with previous findings from the us our results emphasize the presence of pecking-order behavior. At the same time this behavior is not driven by asymmetric information considerations. The static trade-off theory is confirmed by the importance of a target debt ratio in general, but also specifically by tax effects and bankruptcy costs. Overall, we find remarkably low disparities across countries, despite the presence of significant institutional differences. We find that private firms differ in many respects from publicly listed firms, e.g. Listed firms use their stock price for the timing of new issues. Finally, we do not find substantial evidence that agency problems are important in capital structure choice.

Using an international database containing 103 German, UK and US ethical mutual funds we review and extend previous research on ethical mutual fund performance. By applying a Carhart multi-factor model [Carhart, Journal of Finance 57 (1997) 57] we overcome the benchmark problem most prior ethical studies suffered from. After controlling for investment style, we find no evidence of significant differences in risk-adjusted returns between ethical and conventional funds for the 1990–2001 period. Our results also suggest that ethical mutual funds underwent a catching up phase, before delivering financial returns similar to those of conventional mutual funds. Finally, our performance estimates are robust to the inclusion of ethical indexes, which, surprisingly, are not incrementally capable of explaining ethical mutual fund return variation.

In this paper, we develop a portfolio selection model which allocates financial assets by maximising expected return subject to the constraint that the expected maximum loss should meet the Value-at-Risk limits set by the risk manager. Similar to the mean–variance approach a performance index like the Sharpe index is constructed. Furthermore when expected returns are assumed to be normally distributed we show that the model provides almost identical results to the mean–variance approach. We provide an empirical analysis using two risky assets: US stocks and bonds. The results highlight the influence of both non-normal characteristics of the expected return distribution and the length of investment time horizon on the optimal portfolio selection.

The segmentation of the socially responsible investing (SRI) movement with a values-versus-profit orientation solves the puzzling evidence that both socially responsible and controversial stocks produce superior returns. We derive that the segment of values-driven investors primarily uses “negative” screens to avoid controversial stocks, while the profit-driven segment uses “positive” screens. As the result of an empirical analysis over the period 1992–2008, we base our segmentation on investment screens that help us to examine whether values affect prices. We find that, although the profit-driven segment earns abnormal returns in the short run, these profit-generating opportunities do not persist in the long run for SRI stocks. However, our conclusions highlight the observation that different views on SRI can be complementary in the short run.

We study the economic significance of social dimensions in investment decisions by analyzing the holdings of U.S. equity mutual funds over the period 2004–2012. Using these holdings, we measure funds’ exposures to socially sensitive stocks in order to answer two questions. What explains cross-sectional variation in mutual funds’ exposure to controversial companies? Does exposure to controversial stocks drive fund returns? We find that exposures to socially sensitive stocks are weaker for funds that aim to attract socially conscious and institutional investor clientele, and they relate to local political and religious factors. The financial payoff associated with greater “sin” stock exposure is positive and statistically significant, but becomes non-significant with broader definitions of socially sensitive investments. Despite the positive relation between mutual fund return and sin stock exposure, the annualized risk-adjusted return spread between a portfolio of funds with highest sin stock exposure and its lowest-ranked counterpart is statistically not significant. The results suggest that fund managers do not tilt heavily towards controversial stocks because of social considerations and practical constraints.

Copulas offer financial risk managers a powerful tool to model the dependence between the different elements of a portfolio and are preferable to the traditional, correlation-based approach. In this paper, we show the importance of selecting an accurate copula for risk management. We extend standard goodness-of-fit tests to copulas. Contrary to existing, indirect tests, these tests can be applied to any copula of any dimension and are based on a direct comparison of a given copula with observed data. For a portfolio consisting of stocks, bonds and real estate, these tests provide clear evidence in favor of the Student’s t copula, and reject both the correlation-based Gaussian copula and the extreme value-based Gumbel copula. In comparison with the Student’s t copula, we find that the Gaussian copula underestimates the probability of joint extreme downward movements, while the Gumbel copula overestimates this risk. Similarly we establish that the Gaussian copula is too optimistic on diversification benefits, while the Gumbel copula is too pessimistic. Moreover, these differences are significant.

Systemic crises can have grave consequences for investors in international equity markets, because they cause the risk-return trade-off to deteriorate severely for a longer period. We propose a novel approach to include the possibility of systemic crises in asset allocation decisions. By combining regime switching models with Merton [Merton, R.C., 1969. Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: The continuous time case. Review of Economics and Statistics 51, 247–257]-style portfolio construction, our approach captures persistence of crises much better than existing models. Our analysis shows that incorporating systemic crises greatly affects asset allocation decisions, while the costs of ignoring them is substantial. For an expected utility maximizing US investor, who can invest globally these costs range from 1.13% per year of his initial wealth when he has no prior information on the likelihood of a crisis, to over 3% per month if a crisis occurs with almost certainty. If a crisis is taken into account, the investor allocates less to risky assets, and particularly less to the crisis prone emerging markets.

When companies select and use compensation peers to determine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, they create unintended peer effects on corporate innovation due to the similarities between these companies and their compensation peers in terms of product markets, CEO characteristics, and compensation schemes. After controlling for industry and geography peer groups, the findings confirm that the average innovation activity of compensation peers is a significant and distinct predictor of corporate innovation. Further analysis showed that (1) the peer effect is stronger in firms and compensation peers that pay their CEOs using long-term compensation, in firms with stronger labor market competition and board monitoring, and in peer companies that experience higher innovation competition and are closer to the median peer company in the peer group; (2) the obtained results are likely not attributable to the knowledge spillover mechanism and are more consistent with the peer pressure mechanism; and (3) the Securities and Exchange Commission's 2006 executive compensation disclosure rules may have generated peer effects.

We examine the effects of price disclosure on market performance in a continuous experimental multiple-dealer market in which seven professional market makers trade a single security. The dealers trade with one another and with computerized informed and liquidity traders. Our key comparison is between fully public price queues (pretrade transparent market) and bilateral quoting (pretrade opaque). We find that opening spreads are wider and trading volume is lower in the opaque markets due to higher search costs there. More importantly, however, higher search costs also induce more aggressive pricing strategies, so that price discovery is much faster in the opaque markets.