We investigate the willingness of individuals to persist at exploration when confronted by prolonged periods of negative feedback. We design a two-dimensional maze game and run a series of randomized experiments with human subjects in the game. Our results suggest individuals explore more when they are reminded of the incremental cost of their actions, a result that extends prior research on loss aversion and prospect theory to environments characterized by model uncertainty. In addition, we run simulations based on a model of reinforcement learning that extend beyond two-period models of decision making to account for repeated behavior in longer-running, dynamic contexts.

The United States patent system is unique in that it requires applicants to cite documents they know to be relevant to the examination of their patent applications. Lampe (2012) presents evidence that applicants strategically withhold 21%–33% of relevant citations from patent examiners, suggesting that many patents are fraudulently obtained. We challenge this view. We first show that Lampe's empirical design is inconsistent with both legal standards and standard operating procedures, including how courts identify strategic withholding. We then compile comprehensive data to reassess the empirical basis for Lampe's main claim. We find no evidence that applicants withhold citations.