Auditing, Bankruptcy, Market reaction, Audit quality

We examine the accounting choice decision in the context of the timing of adoption of SFAS 87. Unlike most prior studies, we consider interactions between firm characteristics and the magnitudes of the financial statement effects of an accounting decision. We expect that including interactions will both enhance the ability to explain accounting choice, and facilitate distinction between omitted variables (Ball and Foster, 1982) and hypothesized relations. Results are consistent with these expectations.

An event study demonstrates that disclosures of changes in deferred tax valuation allowances (VA) provide information beyond contemporaneous earnings reports. Prior research shows that, in setting VA, managers consider the extent that taxable income is available from various sources for the realization of deferred tax assets (DTA). Our evidence supports a characterization where investors use VA disclosures to infer management's expectations about DTA, its realizability, and future taxable income available for realization. These findings are more generally relevant for assessing the consequences of reporting standards that require or permit management judgment, especially about future outcomes. In particular, they support the view that discretion can be a vehicle for management to communicate expectations to the benefit of investors.

A cross-sectional analysis of cash compensation paid to CEOs of 713 US firms reveals that the sensitivity of compensation to earnings varies directly with earnings persistence. Additional analysis indicates that this sensitivity is greater for cases where executives are approaching retirement. Such evidence suggests the use of earnings persistence to counterbalance adverse consequences of earnings-based contracting with managers who face finite decision horizons.

ABSTRACT: We examine the role of investment opportunities as a determinant of the relative importance of cash flows from operations (CFO) and accruals in firm valuation. We find that at low investment-opportunity levels, CFO value-relevance increases with investment opportunities. When investment opportunities are high, accrual value-relevance declines as investment opportunities increase. Consequently, earnings value-relevance first varies directly and then inversely with investment opportunities. We show that the increase in CFO value-relevance is consistent with cost differentials between internal and external financing causing CFO to be an increasingly important determinant of the realization of investment opportunities. The decline in accrual value-relevance at high investment-opportunity levels appears to be attributable to accounting measurement deficiencies.