We model credibility challenges financial regulators often face when disclosing bank stress test results. Since disclosures influence banks’ risk-taking and depositors’ withdrawal decisions, regulators may have incentives to misreport. We show that regulators can reveal results credibly through imprecise disclosures to both banks and depositors. The regulator reveals only the range or the interval in which the result lies. Crucially, our findings indicate that stress test results can be disclosed credibly without assuming that the regulator is committed to truthful disclosure.

[In a model of the firm in which insiders are privately informed of the firm's prospects and investment is endogenous, this article shows the existence of coarse dividend-signaling equilibria: Dividends partition the space of possible prospects of the firm, and changes in dividends reflect "broad," or nonincremental, changes in these prospects. These equilibria are shown to exist under general preference and technology structures, and it is argued that they closely match the following "anomalous" empirical features of corporate dividend payouts: Dividend changes have nontrivial information effects, yet dividends are smoothed (in a world with cyclic prospects), and dividends are poor predictors of future earnings. Furthermore, in performing comparative statics, this article derives cross-sectional and time-series restrictions on the relation of dividend smoothing to observable firm attributes.]

I provide novel evidence on the real costs of political interference in bank lending. Analyzing staggered state elections in India, I show that politically motivated increased bank lending to farmers before elections crowds out lending to manufacturing firms. These lending distortions are larger where farmers have more political weight and where incumbents have more influence over banks. Reduced bank credit forces manufacturing firms to cut production and operate at lower factor utilization. I also provide evidence suggesting politically motivated increased agricultural lending before state elections contributed towards excessive indebtedness of farmers and a subsequent costly bailout in 2008.

This paper examines stock market behavior associated with interim earnings and marketing‐production disclosures by NYSE industrial corporations during 1905–10. Mean stock price changes are examined to assess whether these firms were more likely to disclose favorable information. We also examine the magnitude of price changes and trading volume to provide evidence on the credibility of these disclosures as perceived by investors. The sample and time period we examine enable us to evaluate the stock market effects of interim disclosures in a discretionary disclosure environment. We find no evidence that these firms were more likely to selectively disclose favorable interim information based on contemporaneous stock price changes. Also, no significant differences are detected in the incidence of interim disclosure before dividend or annual earnings increases compared to dividend cuts/omissions or annual earnings declines. We also document increased trading volume in the announcement week and prior weeks, but significant price changes are restricted to the preannouncement period. These results are driven by firms that do not frequently disclose interim information, and these firms' disclosures are frequently accompanied by concurrent news items (in particular, new financings). Price and volume results are weakly sensitive to the exclusion of cases with concurrent news items. Collectively, our results suggest no systematic tendency to disclose favorable information and managerial disclosures were at least partially credible in the early 20th century disclosure environment. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent la réaction du marché des valeurs mobilières à la publication d'information périodique relative aux bénéfices ainsi qu'à la production et au marketing, par les sociétés industrielles dont les titres étaient inscrits à la Bourse de New York durant la période 1905–1910 et s'intéressent aux variations du cours moyen des titres, afin d'évaluer si ces sociétés étaient davantage enclines à publier de l'information favorable. Ils examinent également l'ampleur des variations du cours des titres et du volume des opérations afin d'établir comment les investisseurs percevaient la crédibilité de l'information publiée. Les variations du cours des titres observées à l'époque ne permettent pas de conclure que ces sociétés étaient davantage enclines à sélectionner l'information périodique la plus favorable, et les auteurs ne détectent pas non plus de différences significatives dans les conséquences de la publication d'information périodique préalablement à des hausses de dividendes ou de bénéfices annuels, par rapport à des réductions ou des omissions de dividendes ou des diminutions des bénéfices annuels. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats portent à croire qu'il n'y a pas de tendance systématique à la publication d'information favorable, et que l'information publiée par la direction est au moins en partie crédible dans le contexte du début du XX e siècle.

We investigate the extent to which income measurement by major early 20th‐century U.S. railroads shows evidence of lower income smoothness and increased conservatism following new fixed asset accounting rules issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1907 and 1908 and concurrent rate regulation regime shifts. Accounting rules promulgated by the ICC after the Hepburn Act of 1906 are the first accounting rules in U.S. history in which regulators could enforce such rules under federal law to increase compliance. Our samplewide results are more consistent with increased conservatism than with income smoothing. Additional tests indicate these effects are more pronounced for firms subject to more intense rate regulation by the ICC, which suggests that the tie‐in between accounting regulation and product/service market regulation influences how managers respond to new accounting rules.

We examine information aggregation regarding industry capital productivity from privately informed managers in a dynamic model with optimal incentive contracts. Information cascades always occur if managers enjoy limited liability: when beliefs regarding productivity become endogenously extreme (optimistic or pessimistic), learning stops. There is no learning if initial beliefs are extreme, or if agency conflicts are severe. In contrast to the literature, cascades occur even when signals have unbounded precision or when there are rich action spaces. Relaxing limited liability constraints is not sufficient to avoid cascades; we provide sufficient conditions for efficient information aggregation through incentive contracts.

Erratum