Alvin Roth's Who Gets What—And Why provides a richly accessible introduction to his pioneering work on market design. Much of economics ignores the institutions that allocate goods, blithely assuming that the mythical Walrasian auctioneer will handle everything perfectly. But markets do fail and Roth details those failures, like the market for law clerks that unravels because clerks and judges commit to each other too quickly. Roth combines theory and pragmatic experience to show how the economist can engineer successful markets. He has even enabled welfare-improving trades in kidney exchanges, where law and social repugnance forbids cash payments. (JEL C78, D47)

The two books being reviewed are concerned with the importance of slavery in the antebellum US South for the economic development of the Northern states. One (Schermerhorn) deals primarily with Southern financial arrangements facilitating the sales of slaves and cotton. The other (Baptist) presents a broader picture of masters' treatment of slaves, as well as how the incomes of slaveowners spurred the demand for Northern industrial production. The review argues that both books overstate the importance of slavery and cotton production for US economic growth. (JEL J15, N11, N31, N51, P16)

Abstract We present a model in which flat (state-independent) capital requirements are undesirable because of shocks to bank capital. There is a rationale for countercyclical capital requirements that impose lower capital demands when aggregate bank capital is low. However, such capital requirements also have a cost as they increase systemic risk taking: by insulating banks against aggregate shocks (but not bank-specific ones), they create incentives to invest in correlated activities. As a result, the economy’s sensitivity to shocks increases and systemic crises can become more likely. Capital requirements that directly incentivize banks to become less correlated dominate countercyclical policies as they reduce both systemic risk-taking and cyclicality.

Abstract Liquidity plays an important role in global research. We identify high-quality liquidity proxies based on low-frequency (daily) data, which provide 1,000× to 10,000× computational savings compared to computing high-frequency (intraday) liquidity measures. We find that: (i) Closing Percent Quoted Spread is the best monthly percent-cost proxy when available, (ii) Amihud, Closing Percent Quoted Spread Impact, LOT Mixed Impact, High–Low Impact, and FHT Impact are tied as the best monthly cost-per-dollar-volume proxy, (iii) the daily version of Closing Percent Quoted Spread is the best daily percent-cost proxy, and (iv) the daily version of Amihud is the best daily cost-per-dollar-volume proxy.

In an approach analogous to Rajan and Zingales (1998), we examine how the ability to access long-term debt affects firm-level growth volatility. We find that firms in industries with stronger preference to use long-term finance relative to short-term finance experience lower growth volatility in countries with better-developed financial systems, as these firms may benefit from reduced refinancing risk. Institutions that facilitate the availability of credit information and contract enforcement mitigate refinancing risk and therefore growth volatility associated with short-term financing. Increased availability of long-term finance reduces growth volatility in crisis as well as non-crisis periods.

A model in which homebuyers make a modest approximation leads house prices to display three features present in the data but usually missing from rational models: momentum at one-year horizons, mean reversion at five-year horizons, and excess longer-term volatility relative to fundamentals. Approximating buyers assume that past prices reflect only contemporaneous demand, just like professional economists who use trends in housing prices to infer trends in housing demand. Consistent with survey evidence, this approximation leads buyers to expect increases in the market value of their homes after recent house price increases.

The shape of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) term structure conveys information about the price of variance risk rather than expected changes in the VIX, a rejection of the expectations hypothesis. The second principal component, SLOPE, summarizes nearly all this information, predicting the excess returns of synthetic Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 variance swaps, VIX futures, and S&P 500 straddles for all maturities and to the exclusion of the rest of the term structure. SLOPE’s predictability is incremental to other proxies for the conditional variance risk premia, economically significant, and inconsistent with standard asset pricing models.

We describe the process through which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) makes filings “publicly available.” For a sample of Form 4 (insider trade) filings, we show that, during the period we examine, the majority of filings are available to paying subscribers of the SEC's public dissemination system (PDS) feed before they are posted to the EDGAR website, and so provide subscribers and their clients with a private advantage. We show that this advantage translates into an economically significant trading advantage, and prices, volumes, and spreads respond to the news contained in filings beginning around 30 seconds before public posting. These findings indicate that the SEC dissemination process does not always provide a level playing field and that the meaning of publicly available information in capital markets is no longer simple or obvious. In response to our study, the SEC launched an investigation and agreed to eliminate the PDS timing advantage.