Little is known about the price firms pay for stock repurchases. Using a data set of all U.S. repurchases from 2004 to 2011, we compare the actual average price paid monthly in a repurchase with the average market price for the same stock over various horizons. We find that firms repurchase stock at a significantly lower price than the average market price in all sample years. Less frequent repurchasers, firms that repurchase when insiders buy on their own account, and firms that experience low stock returns prior to the repurchase obtain significantly lower prices. After controlling for risk factors, repurchasing firms earn positive returns. Infrequent repurchasers earn a significantly higher return up to three years following the actual repurchase.

Recent papers have proposed a link between underpricing of an initial public offering (IPO) and the resulting ownership structure of the firm. Brennan and Franks [J. Financ. Econ. 45 (1997) 391] hypothesize that IPO managers want to discourage new blockholdings to reduce the likelihood of being monitored. They show that underpricing encourages oversubscription, allowing discrimination against large blockholders. Conversely, Stoughton and Zechner [J. Financ. Econ. 49 (1998) 45] hypothesize that managers underprice to encourage investment by blockholders who provide monitoring services. We find that the link between underpricing and ownership structure is weak. Most firms have outside blocks in place at the IPO and retain them afterwards. In terms of acquiring new blockholders, there is no difference between firms that underprice and those that do not.

ABSTRACT We examine 1,948 share lockup agreements that prevent insiders from selling their shares in the period immediately after the IPO (typically 180 days). While lockups are in effect, there is little selling by insiders. When lockups expire, we find a permanent 40 percent increase in average trading volume, and a statistically prominent three‐day abnormal return of −1.5 percent. The abnormal return and volume are much larger when the firm is financed by venture capital, and we find that venture capitalists sell more aggressively than executives and other shareholders. We find limited support for several hypotheses that may explain the abnormal return, but no complete explanation.

Abstract We test the hypothesis that insider trading impairs market liquidity by analyzing intraday trades and quotes around 1,497 IPO lockup expirations in the period 1995–1999. We find that, while lockup expirations are associated with considerable insider trading for some IPO firms, they have little effect on effective spreads. By contrast, two other liquidity measures, quote depth and trading activity, improve substantially. In the 23% of lockup expirations where insiders disclose share sales, spreads actually decline. These findings indicate that a large body of well-informed, blockholding insider traders can enter a market from which they had previously been absent, and substantially change trading volume and share price without impairing market liquidity.

Abstract Consistent with institutions having an advantage over individuals, we find that newly public firms with the highest levels of institutional investment significantly outperform those with the lowest levels. While prior literature has attributed much of institutions’ higher returns around various corporate events to private information, we find that much of the difference simply reflects better interpretation of readily available public information. Individuals disproportionately invest in the types of firms that earn significantly lower abnormal returns over the long run. Individuals either disregard or misinterpret the relevance of readily available public information, and as a result, they bear the brunt of IPO underperformance.

While the percentage of mature firms with classified boards or dual class shares has declined by more than 40% since 1990, the percentage of IPO firms with these structures has doubled over this period. We test whether IPO firms implement these structures optimally or whether they are utilized to allow managers to protect their private benefits of control. Both shareholder voting patterns and changes in firm types going public suggest that the Agency Hypothesis best explains IPO firm's use of dual class, particularly when there is a large voting-cash flow wedge. In contrast, among firms with high information asymmetry, classified board structures are better explained by the Optimal Governance hypothesis.

Prior research finds that firms hire directors for their acquisition experience, regardless of acquisition quality (whether their prior acquisitions earned positive or negative announcement returns). Using several short- and long-run measures, we examine the effects of directors’ acquisition experience on the acquisition performance of firms hiring them. We find that board acquisition experience is positively related to subsequent acquisition performance, demonstrating that firms appropriately value experience. Beyond experience itself, however, the quality of directors’ prior acquisitions is also important. Our results suggest that firms may be better served to select directors based upon both past acquisition experience and acquisition performance.

Securities litigation poses large costs to firms. The risk of litigation is heightened when firms have unexpectedly large earnings disappointments. Previous literature presents mixed evidence on whether voluntary disclosure of the bad news prior to scheduled earnings announcements deters or triggers litigation. We show that the counterintuitive finding in prior literature that disclosure triggers litigation could be driven by the endogeneity between disclosure and litigation. Using a simultaneous equations methodology, we find no evidence that disclosure triggers litigation. In fact, consistent with economic arguments, our evidence suggests that disclosure potentially deters certain types of litigation.

ABSTRACT Many firms deploy takeover defenses when they go public. IPO managers tend to deploy defenses when their compensation is high, shareholdings are small, and oversight from nonmanagerial shareholders is weak. The presence of a defense is negatively related to subsequent acquisition likelihood, yet has no impact on takeover premiums for firms that are acquired. These results do not support arguments that takeover defenses facilitate the eventual sale of IPO firms at high takeover premiums. Rather, they suggest that managers shift the cost of takeover protection onto nonmanagerial shareholders. Thus, agency problems are important even for firms at the IPO stage.

Busy directors have been widely criticized as being ineffective. However, we hypothesize that busy directors offer advantages for many firms. While busy directors may be less effective monitors, their experience and contacts arguably make them excellent advisors. Among IPO firms, which have minimal experience with public markets and likely rely heavily on their directors for advising, we find busy boards to be common and to contribute positively to firm value. Moreover, these positive effects of busy boards extend to all but the most established firms. Benefits are lowest among Forbes 500 firms, which likely require more monitoring than advising.