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Lenos Trigeorgis, A Log-Transformed Binomial Numerical Analysis Method for Valuing Complex Multi-Option Investments, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Sep., 1991), pp. 309-326

We contribute to multinationality and real options theories by considering the role of firm heterogeneity in real options awareness for MNCs. We test the joint impact of real options awareness (RO-AWN) and multinationality on firm value using an extensive sample of U.S.-listed international firms over the ten-year period 1996–2005. We show that when a firm's growth options and degree of RO-AWN are considered, multinationality has a significant positive impact on firm value and performance as measured by Tobin's Q, return-on-assets and the 3-year average stock returns. We find that the benefits of multinationality accrue asymmetrically to firms differing in RO-AWN. Managers who are more aware of their corporate real options are able to significantly enhance firm value. Our findings are robust to a range of dataset and measurement specifications, endogeneity issues and controlling for alternative theories of the firm.

This paper examines the relationship between investors' ambiguity in the financial options market and systemic banks' risk. Eliciting ambiguity information from option pricing data on the twelve major U.S. banks between 2003 and 2010, we show that higher behavioral deviations from risk-neutral and Bayesian valuation (i.e., investor ambiguity) are associated with higher systemic banks' downside, market and credit risks. Consistent with behavioral explanations, we confirm the detrimental effect of ambiguity on financial market outcomes and find strong evidence of ambiguity among call and put option holders. Variance decomposition indicates that such a pattern of behavior explains a significant proportion of U.S. banking risk variance. This effect is more pronounced during periods of economic turbulence and bank stress (i.e., the 2007–2009 crisis), and holds after controlling for size, tail risk, implied volatility, and volatility of volatility dynamics. We also document that ambiguity from the financial market has a depressing impact on real economic activity, including capacity utilization, non-farm payrolls and overall economic performance. Our findings are robust to alternative specifications of ambiguity such as multiple priors and expected utilities with uncertain probabilities.

Abstract We extend the Fama-French (1992) model by considering growth option (as well as distress/leverage) variables in explaining the cross section of stock returns. We find that growth option variables, namely growth in capital investment and yet-unexercised growth options (GO), are significantly and negatively related to stock returns. Investors may be willing to accept lower average returns from growth stocks in exchange for a more favorable (positively skewed) risk-return profile. Book-to-market (BM) ratio seems to proxy for omitted distress/leverage variables. When these are explicitly accounted for, BM is not that significant. Our growth options variables have added explanatory power.

We present a pricing model of bank bailout insurance guarantees against tail risk and empirical evidence that provides a rational explanation why big bank equities “underperform” relative to small banks during normal times while they “overperform” during crises. A new measure accounting for left-tail risk protection against losses conditional on a crisis explains the “underperformance” of large banks during normal periods. Over the long-term spanning several economic cycles, bank assets are fairly priced regardless of size. Our empirical evidence supports our model’s predicted pattern of excess bank return reversals across economic cycles following Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) bailout policy in 1984.

We show how firm-level real options lead to idiosyncratic skewness in stock returns. We then document empirically that growth option variables are positive and significant determinants of idiosyncratic skewness. The real option impact on skewness is more significant in firms with lottery-type features, small size, high volatility, distressed, low return on assets, and low book-to-market ratio. We also find that expectation on idiosyncratic skewness is associated with lower Sharpe ratios. This suggests investors are willing to sacrifice mean-variance portfolio efficiency for greater skewness deriving from real options. Furthermore, financial flexibility has a positive incremental effect, enhancing the beneficial role of asset flexibility on idiosyncratic skewness.

Considerable debate surrounds how the US government's TARP bailout intervention has affected the risk-taking and moral hazard behavior of U.S. banks around the global financial crisis. We examine this issue with a focus on lottery behavior introducing MAX/MIN as a new measure of lotteryness in banking to capture the loss protection from bank bailout guarantees. We find that the TARP bailout increased the likelihood of bank lotteryness and risk shifting. Lottery-like bank equities are riskier after TARP and exhibit fatter right to left tails. A consistent pattern of risk taking and lottery behavior extends both before and after the 2008–2009 crisis, engulfing the largest systemic banks (SIFIs). While confirming that lottery-like bank equities have lower short-term return, we find they exhibit better cumulative long-term return performance. Our findings have important policy implications regarding government intervention in banking crises.