Abstract Using a large panel of more than 140,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), this study examines SOEs’ investment behavior surrounding 82 national elections in 25 European countries between 2001 and 2015. We find that SOEs increase their corporate investment by about 29% of the sample average during national election years. This effect is more pronounced in fixed timing and closely contested elections. The effect is also stronger in countries with low institutional quality, more centralized political systems, and state-controlled banking systems. In contrast, we find the matched non-SOEs significantly decrease their corporate investment during national election years. (JEL G18, G30, G32, E22) Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Investment banker human capital is valuable in mergers and acquisitions. Exploiting a unique hand-built dataset, this paper studies whether and how investment banker's education and experience impact the merger performance in China. We find that investment bankers' education credentials are positively related to the post-merger performance; however, greater investment banker experience does not. We further explore the channels and show that the education effect is stronger in deals with higher information asymmetry and acquirers with worse corporate governance. On the other hand, experience increases merger performance in deals with high information asymmetry but reduces deal performance in poorly governed firms. Our findings suggest that higher education attainment facilitates both the advisory and monitoring role of investment bankers, while more experience makes investment bankers better advisors yet worse monitors. Our findings also suggest that investment bankers' roles in value creation are highly dependent on different institutional backgrounds, and one cannot generalize the findings in the U.S. across borders.

We examine the impact of internal coalition, measured by the appointment of the top executives and directors by the CEO after he assumes office, on stock crash risk during 2000–2014. The appointment-based internal coalition has a positive and significant impact on stock crash risk. Internal coalition is a more important factor than measures of CEO power, such as CEO tenure and duality, in predicting stock price crash. We address the endogeneity concerns by utilizing an exogenous shock to the internal coalition to conduct difference-in-differences (DID) regressions. The main results survive numerous robustness tests.