Dealers enter nonbinding expressions of interest during the Nasdaq preopening to promote price discovery and ease stock inventory management when the market opens. But does this practice of “indicating ahead” constitute best execution for an individual customer? Arguments in favor of the practice rely on the notion that best execution is a general condition as opposed to a concept applicable on a trade-by-trade basis. Some customers must sacrifice in individual instances to improve the functioning of the overall market. But the practice of indicating ahead violates the dealer agent's duty of loyalty to her individual customer. Moreover, the dealer's financial self-interest is best served by indicating ahead. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G18, K22.

The national origin of an individual's human capital is a crucial determinant of its value. Education and labor market experience acquired abroad are significantly less valued than human capital obtained domestically. This difference can fully explain the earnings disadvantage of immigrants relative to comparable natives in Israel. Variation in the return to foreign schooling across origin countries may reflect differences in its quality and compatibility with the host labor market. The return to foreign experience is generally insignificant. Acquiring additional education following immigration appears to confer a compound benefit by raising the return to education acquired abroad. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.

This article examines the effect of asymmetric information on the trading of underwriting risk between insurers and reinsurers and how it is mitigated in a context of long-term relationships. It begins by explaining how information problems affect the efficiency of the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers and how long-term implicit contracts allow the inclusion of new information in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. A key feature of these relationships is the reliance on loss-contingent rebates and commissions in the pricing of reinsurance coverage. We argue that when information is revealed only over time, long-term implicit contracts between insurers and reinsurers allow the inclusion of new information into reinsurance pricing. Because of this feature, the allocation of risk between insurers and reinsurers is more efficient. Specifically, such arrangements lead to more reinsurance coverage, higher insurer profits, and lower expected distress in the industry. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G22, G13, L15, D81.

Natural resources, by their nature, are not readily bent to the status of private property. Efficient resource use is complicated by jurisdictional externalities, public goods, non-use values, and beneficiaries spatially separated from the location of resources. The task is made more challenging by ecological complexity that obscures cause (benefits) and effects (costs), and dramatic time lags between individual actions and subsequent social consequences that, together with substantial uncertainty, introduce the chance of irreversibilities. Resource economists have played a major role in the literature on externalities, the development of individual transferable quotas, non-market valuation techniques and common property management.

Economists were among the many scholars uprooted following Hitler's rise to power in 1933. This article reviews a series of books edited by Harald Hagemann and others which provide extensive biographical information on 314 German-speaking economists whose professional opportunities were shattered by Nazi policies. It evaluates the impact of the massive emigration on economic research and teaching in Germany and Austria and in the nations to which most of the economists emigrated. An analysis of 1966-70 data reveals that the emigres' cited publication counts were equivalent to the citations of three leading U.S. economics departments.

In this study, we appeal to insights and results from Davidson and Neu 1993 and McConomy 1998 to motivate empirical analyses designed to gain a better understanding of the relationship between auditor quality and forecast accuracy. We extend and refine Davidson and Neu's analysis of this relationship by introducing additional controls for business risk and by considering data from two distinct time periods: one in which the audit firm's responsibility respecting the earnings forecast was to provide review‐level assurance, and one in which its responsibility was to provide audit‐level assurance. Our sample data consist of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) initial public offerings (IPOs). The earnings forecast we consider is the one‐year‐ahead management earnings forecast included in the IPO offering prospectus. The results suggest that after the additional controls for business risk are introduced, the relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality for the review‐level assurance period is no longer significant. The results also indicate that the shift in regimes alters the fundamental nature of the relationship. Using data from the audit‐level assurance regime, we find a negative and significant relationship between forecast accuracy and auditor quality (i.e., we find Big 6 auditors to be associated with smaller absolute forecast errors than non‐Big 6 auditors), and further, that the difference in the relationship between the two regimes is statistically significant.

In this article, I use the principal‐agent framework to examine the incentives of risk‐and work‐averse agents to work on projects that are long‐term, multistage, and subject to abandonment. Periodic applications of effort by the agent are required. The agent also obtains private information as the project evolves, and he decides whether the project should be abandoned or continued. The principal not only seeks to provide incentives to induce the agent to take up such risky investments and work hard at them, but also seeks to provide incentives for the agent to abandon the project if the profit prospect is low. We show that the agent's decision to continue is not always aligned with the principal's desire. The result provides an economic rationale for the sunk cost phenomenon. There also exist conditions under which the agent chooses to prematurely abandon the project.

This study examines the stock market forecasts and portfolio allocation decisions of small individual investors, based on survey data for 1987-1994. When investors are bullish, they increase their equity holdings; when investors are bearish, they decrease equity holdings. The surveyed investors are unable to time the stock market successfully. However, the shifts in their portfolios reflect past market movements and are consistent with positive feedback trading. I. Introduction There can be no doubt that, over short horizons, stock price changes are highly unpredictable. Nevertheless, many individuals discover seeming in past prices and trade based on the expectation that the trends will persist. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) call these investors positive feedback traders.

We examine valuation effects of announcements of seasoned equity issuance and assess the impact of the choice of flotation method in the U.K. Rights offerings are predominant, but in 1986, British firms gained the flexibility to conduct placings, which are comparable to U.S. firm commitment offerings. A placing is a fixed-price bought deal that increases ownership dispersion. Placings generate significantly positive share price effects, whereas rights offerings have large negative valuation effects that become more adverse after 1985. We conclude that the option to conduct placings enhances the ability of firms to signal their quality and to use a seasoned equity offering to reduce ownership concentration.