This paper tests a new hypothesis that bank managers issue public debt, at least in part, to convey positive, private information and refrain from issuance to hide negative, private information. This “positive selection” hypothesis is tested against the traditional “adverse selection” hypothesis. We find evidence for “positive selection,” using ratings migrations, equity returns, bond issuance, and balance sheet data for US bank holding companies. The results add to our understanding of “market discipline” in monitoring bank holding companies and also inform upon how proposed regulatory requirements that banking organizations frequently issue public debt might augment “market discipline.”

This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic programming model of optimal educational financing decisions. The main purpose of the paper is to measure the effect of short-term parental cash transfers, received during school, on educational borrowing and in-school work decisions, and on post-graduation lifetime earnings. The estimated parameters of the model imply that parental cash transfers do not significantly influence post-graduation lifetime earnings. Long-term factors such as family background and prior human capital investments are more important. Parental cash transfers do, however, significantly determine the decision to borrow or work during school and the level of lifetime consumption. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

This paper formulates and estimates a dynamic programming model of optimal educational financing decisions. The main purpose of the paper is to measure the effect of short-term parental cash transfers, received during school, on educational borrowing and in-school work decisions, and on post-graduation lifetime earnings. The estimated parameters of the model imply that parental cash transfers do not significantly influence post-graduation lifetime earnings. Long-term factors such as family background and prior human capital investments are more important. Parental cash transfers do, however, significantly determine the decision to borrow or work during school and the level of lifetime consumption.

This article studies equilibrium asset pricing when agents face nonnegative wealth constraints. In the presence of these constraints it is shown that options on the market portfolio are nonredundant securities and the economy's pricing kernel is a function of both the market portfolio and the nonredundant options. This implies that the options should be useful for explaining risky asset returns. To test the theory, a model is derived in which the expected excess return on any risky asset is linearly related (via a collection of betas) to the expected excess return on the market portfolio and to the expected excess returns on the nonredundant options. The empirical results indicate that the returns on traded index options are relevant for explaining the returns on risky asset portfolios.

Are there agglomeration economies in crime? The positive correlation between city size and crime rates is well-known. This paper establishes a positive relationship between youth cohort size and marijuana use rates. It further demonstrates a negative association between youth cohort size and marijuana prices, youth drug possession arrest rates, and both overall and youth sales arrest rates. Cohort size affects demand by lowering possession arrest probabilities, but this factor explains less than 10 percent of the relationship. The main effect shown here, accounting for at least a quarter of the relationship, is on the supply of marijuana. Larger youth cohorts yield thicker drug markets that, through lower sales arrest risk and informational economies, generate cost-savings in drug distribution.

I analyze a sequential bargaining model in which players are optimistic about their bargaining power (measured as the probability of making offers), but learn as they play the game. I show that there exists a uniquely predetermined settlement date, such that in equilibrium the players always reach an agreement at that date, but never reach one before it. Given any discount rate, if the learning is sufficiently slow, the players agree immediately. I show that, for any speed of learning, the agreement is delayed arbitrarily long, provided that the players are sufficiently patient. Therefore, although excessive optimism alone cannot cause delay, it can cause long delays if the players are expected to learn.