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Sensitivity to Market Incentives: The Case of Policy Loans

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1987 69(2), 286
The standard neoclassical theory is rejected as an explanation for the observed reluctance of most holders of whole life insurance to borrow against the cash value of their policies at favorable rates of interest. Even when the neoclassical theory is augmented with transactions costs and short awareness lags, several empirical tests using survey and time-series data reject the standard theory in favor of an explanation invoking self-imposed rules against borrowing or the "debt ethic." This evidence lends support to the psychology-based theories of Thaler and Shefrin (1981).

Specification of the Joy of Giving: Insights from Altruism

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1988 70(1), 145 open access
This paper analyzes the joy of giving bequest motive in which the utility obtained from leaving a bequest depends only on the size of the bequest. It exploits the fact that this formulation can be interpreted as a reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive to derive a relation between the value of the altruism parameter and the value of the joy of giving parameter. Using previous discussions of an a priori range of plausible values for the altruism parameter we then derive plausible restrictions on the joy of giving parameter. We demonstrate that this parameter may well be orders of magnitude larger than assumed in the existing literature.

The Cost of Annuities: Implications for Saving Behavior and Bequests

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1990 105(1), 135
The fact that most eldealy individuals in the United States choose to maintain a flat age-wealth profile, rather than buy individual life annuities, stands in contrast to central implications of the standard life-cycle model of consumption-saving behavior. The analysis in this paper lends support to an explanation for this phenomenon based either on the cost of annuities, importantly including the element of that cost due to adverse selection, or on the interaction of that cost and an intentional bequest motive. Expected yields offered on individual life annuities in the United States are lower by some 4-6%, or 2 1/2-4 1/2% after allowing for adverse selection, than yields on alternative long-term fixed-income investments. Simulations of an extended model of life-cycle saving and portfolio behavior, allowing explicitly for uncertain lifetimes and Social Security, show that yield differentials in this range can account for the observed behavior, even in the absence of a bequest motive, during the early years of retirement. By contrast, at older ages the combination of yield differentials in this range and a positive bequest motive is necessary to do so.